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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION
After the news stories that Google saved $60 billion in U.S. taxes using
the so-called Dutch Sandwich scheme1 and that the European Commission
ordered Apple in 2016 to reimburse Ireland over $13 billion for tax benefits
received by its Irish subsidiaries,2 even a casual news reader understood
that Apple, Google, and many other multinational companies used a tax
planning strategy that shifted profits offshore to a tax-friendly country to
reduce its tax liability in the United States and abroad. Because so many
multinational companies engage in this type of investment in a foreign
country, referred to as foreign direct investment (FDI), tax scholars frequently
examine the strategies employed by multinational companies when routing
FDI into a foreign country.3

1. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 707–
14 (2011); Jesse Drucker, “Dutch Sandwich” Saves Google Billions in Taxes, BLOOMBERG
B USINESSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2010, 1:26 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39784907/ns/
business-us_business/t/dutch-sandwich-saves-google-billions-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/
4R8E-3CFV]; Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Is Lost to Tax
Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html
[https://perma.cc/NNY3-MLLS].
2. See generally Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International
Tax and Ownership Nationality, 68 TAX L. REV. 207 (2015). In regard to Apple’s tax strategy,
see, for example, Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.)
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong., 152–91 (2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-113shrg81657/html/CHRG-113shrg81657.htm [https://perma.cc/8QZG-CU2C];
Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategyaims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html [https://perma.cc/D3GA-HZDZ]; James Kanter
& Mark Scott, Apple Owes $14.5 Billion in Back Taxes to Ireland, E.U. Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/technology/apple-tax-eu-ireland.html
[https://perma.cc/76WD-7NB8].
3. FDI is usually defined as ownership of foreign investors of a controlling form,
typically at least 10% of voting stock in the local investing entity. Michael J. Graetz & Itai
Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 547 (2003). There
is plenty of traditional international tax scholarship accumulated with regard to FDI, so
the examples of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are easily caught by international tax
policy radar screens, attracting constant attention from the public and academia. For FDI
in general, see for example, Pol Antràs, Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley, Multinational
Firms, FDI Flows, and Imperfect Capital Markets, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1171 (2009); Lars P. Feld
& Jost H. Heckemeyer, FDI and Taxation: A Meta-Study, 25 J. ECON. SURV. 233 (2011);
Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr, International Taxation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8854, 2002).
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But what do we know about the tax strategies of foreign indirect investment,
or fund investment in usual terms,4 that is distinguished from FDI? This
type of investment happens via multinational funds managed by large
investment management firms like Blackstone, KKR, or Apollo Global
Management,5 as shown in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 is publicly disclosed
in a financial statement of Apollo Global Management. However, it is hard
to understand the exact fund investment structure by just looking into Figure 1.
Moreover, plenty of resources focus on the multinational companies’ tax
strategies in foreign direct investment, both to attack and to defend such
strategies, 6 but little research has been done to date analyzing the tax
consequences of foreign indirect investment managed by multinational
fund managers. On the one hand, are there any harmful tax practices in
multinational indirect investment comparable to FDI? On the other, are there
any disadvantageous aspects of tax law for multinational indirect investment?
Existing rules and literature gradually have come to recognize the lack
of systemic rules for foreign indirect investment as part of an issue in
portfolio investment.7 However, given that portfolio investment refers to
a passive feature of investment with less than 10% ownership and does not
necessarily overlap with indirect or fund investment, the existing studies
do not offer clear answers to the above questions relating to fund investments
in particular.8

4. In this Article, “indirect investment” refers to an investment that pools capital
for investment from multiple investors and invests in the underlying assets through vehicles,
such as funds, trusts, or other entities. It is commonly called “fund investment” or “collective
investment,” although the definitions of each do not necessarily refer to the same thing.
5. Blackstone, KKR, and Apollo Global Management, LLC are New York-based
private equity houses, ranked at second, third, and fourth, respectively, in 2018 in PRIVATE
EQUITY INT’L, PEI 300, at 24 (2019), https://d16yj43vx3i1f6.cloudfront.net/uploads/2019/
07/300_PEI_Jun_Digi.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9DT-73Q2].
6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., DORON HERMAN, TAXING PORTFOLIO INCOME IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS 201 (2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1331 (1996); Graetz & Grinberg, supra
note 3, at 547–48; Yaron Z. Reich, Taxing Foreign Investors’ Portfolio Investments in the
U.S.: Developments & Discontinuities, 16 TAX NOTES 1975, 1976 (1998) (focusing on
inbound Foreign Portfolio Investment).
8. See generally Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Carried Interest and Beyond: The
Nature of Private Equity Investment and Its International Tax Implications, 37 VA. TAX
REV. 421 (2018).
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FIGURE 1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF APOLLO GLOBAL
MANAGEMENT9
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Apollo Glob. Mgmt., LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 80 (Feb. 13, 2017).
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Furthermore, the recent tax reform in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)
of 2017 adopted many changes in the U.S. international tax system, including
many provisions that exempt U.S. taxpayers foreign source income from
taxation.10 However, such change is again limited to FDI, and the tax reform
is silent on the foreign indirect investment by multinational funds.11
To fill the gap in the underdeveloped international tax law for indirect
fund investments, this Article proposes a general rule of pass-through taxation
in international tax law and demonstrates the feasibility of its implementation
in the case of private equity funds (PEFs) in particular.12 The Article primarily
deals with taxation on multinational fund investments involving intermediary
entities in one or more jurisdictions.
For example, Figure 1 depicts a simplified version of a PEF’s firm structure.
It shows multiple offshore portfolio companies at the bottom of the structure
but does not clearly show the specific intermediary entities in foreign countries
in the middle of the structure. If one picks a vertical slice of the structure
for one portfolio company and expands it with greater detail, the picture
looks like Figure 2.

10. See I.R.C. § 245A (2012). For general introduction to the international tax
provisions in the TCJA, see generally Susan C. Morse, International Cooperation and the
2017 Tax Act, 128 YALE L.J.F. 362 (2018). Such change made the U.S. international tax
system depart from the worldwide tax system that taxes U.S. taxpayers’ worldwide income.
However, the TCJA did not fully embrace the territorial tax system that entirely exempts
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign source income from taxation, because it maintains the Subpart F regime
and adds a minimum tax on global low-taxed intangible income (GILTI). Id. at 368.
11. The TCJA of 2017 introduced provisions where dividends received by a U.S.
corporation from foreign subsidiaries are generally exempted from tax. See I.R.C. § 245A.
However, this change does not apply to dividends received by noncorporate taxpayers,
such as PEFs and their individual partners. JASON FACTOR & MEYER FEDIDA, CLEARY GOTTLIEB,
TAX CUTS & JOBS ACT: CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUNDS 5 (2018), https://www.clearygottlieb.
com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-2017/
updates-1-2-18/tcja-summary--private-equity-jan-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/49JW-ZPPP].
12. Cf. Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX
L. REV. 261, 327 & n.254 (2001) (arguing that international tax policies on FDI and foreign
indirect investment should be studied separately, and noting that a proposal of appropriate
rules for venture capital funds abroad has rarely been made). This Article focuses on PEF
among various types of investment funds because the information hurdles discussed in Part
V would be easier to overcome in the PEF context than in others. Furthermore, the nature
of PEF is distinguished from other investment funds, especially mutual funds, in many aspects.
See generally Kim, supra note 8.
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FIGURE 2. STRUCTURE OF THE LONE STAR FUND CASE13
n-US In vestors

US Investors

Lone Star Employees

Hudson Partners Korea Ltd.
(Bermuda)

2%

37.992%

Lone Star Capital In vestments

S.ar.L.
(Luxembourg)

99.99%

Lone Star Capital
Management SPRL
(Belgium)

Purchaser A
Purchaser B

Korean Company

Real Estate

13. This chart is reconstructed by the author based on the chart in Appendix 2, Table
2 of the 2009 Seoul Administrative Court case. Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin.
Ct.], 2007Guhap37650, Feb. 16, 2009, (app. 2, tbl.2), aff’d, Seoul High Court [Seoul High
Ct.], 2009Nu8016, Feb. 12, 2010, aff’d, Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Du5950, Jan. 27,
2012 (S. Kor.). Lone Star Funds is a Texas-based private equity house, ranked twentieth
in PRIVATE EQUITY INT’L, THE 300 BIGGEST PRIVATE EQUITY GROUPS ON THE PLANET PEI
300, at 44 (2014), https://view57.book118.com/?readpage=B6hsvb_jMgOceYoVaxt4Zg
==&furl=o4j9ZG7fK94rVJzZe@iWioCk0LM3IOMw34OPBWskxqDFf25WiQZ3v5VZ
xzNexkULJuUDLCM@MpF8Veuu1BT3bAv@SY_W9@jVK@HLP9Lz8jMKO_v1o8t
L9Q==&n=1 [https://perma.cc/G4D6-TNAR].
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This Article analyzes the investment structures of multinational funds
and offers paradigm cases to lay the groundwork for proposing pass-through
taxation. In the paradigm cases, there are at least three relevant tax jurisdictions:
(1) the source country where the income is produced—South Korea in
Figure 2; (2) the residence country where investors who realize the foreignsource income are residing—Unites States, among others, in Figure 2;14
and (3) the intermediate country where intermediary entities are allegedly
residing—Belgium, Luxembourg, and Bermuda in Figure 2. The consequence
of pass-through taxation within international tax regimes will be to eliminate
the tax relevance of entities in those intermediate countries.
In domestic tax systems, indirect investment like fund investment typically
does not entail entity-level taxation.15 Investors thus enjoy tax neutrality
between indirect and direct investment because most countries offer passthrough tax systems, such as partnership taxation, for fund investment.16
In other words, an individual person investing in stock of a company through
a fund vehicle pays the same amount of tax on the investment return, such
as dividends and capital gains, as they would have had they invested in that
stock directly without using a fund vehicle.
In contrast, investors in international fund investment may not enjoy tax
neutrality between direct and indirect investment. As a formal matter, current
international tax rules do not entirely eliminate entity-level taxation in indirect
investment, especially when the investment structure is spread across multiple
countries.17 The opacity of fund vehicles in intermediate countries makes
it hard to look through the vehicles and tax investors in a residence country,

14. The category of source country versus residence country maps very roughly on
to that of developing versus developed country in non-tax terminology. Although the parallels
are not exact, a large number of source countries are developing countries, such as Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (BRIC), and a large number of residence countries are developed
countries, such as the members of the OECD. See TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, TAX JUSTICE BRIEFING:
SOURCE AND RESIDENCE TAXATION 2–3 (2005), https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
Source_and_residence_taxation_-_SEP-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/762R-8QQL].
15. See DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE
FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGER 2–3 (2014).
16. Therefore, investing through a pass-through entity was preferred to a taxable
corporation before the TCJA. However, the TCJA reduced the statutory corporate tax rate
from 35% to 21%; thus, investing through a taxable corporation can sometimes be better
than investing directly, at least domestically. See, e.g., Joshua Franklin, Private Equity
Firm KKR Opts To Become C-Corp After U.S. Tax Reform, REUTERS (May 3, 2018, 4:01
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kkr-results/private-equity-firm-kkr-to-convertto-a-corporation-after-u-s-tax-reform-idUSKBN1I4164 [https://perma.cc/9H9S-F6J4].
Nonetheless, this explanation on comparing taxable corporations and pass-through entities
for tax purposes does not uphold in the multi-jurisdictional analysis, as explained in the
next paragraph of the text, especially when the intermediary entity is usually required to promptly
distribute funds.
17. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 8, at 443–45.
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as income is distributed from the source country. Thus, investors may not
claim tax treaty benefits mitigating potential double taxation18 that ought
to be available in direct investment, and they end up with tax consequences
worse than direct investment.
As a result, investors have created many strategies to reduce tax liabilities
in relevant countries to achieve the tax consequences that they would have
enjoyed in a domestic tax environment.19 Such planning might be understood
as a sort of self-help path to tax neutrality between direct investment and
indirect investment.
Sometimes, however, investors take further steps to continue to minimize
their tax liability by taking advantage of underdeveloped and unclear rules.
Such aggressive practices include treaty shopping,20 the use of a hybrid
instrument or entity that produces a mismatch in tax treatment in different
countries—hybrid mismatches,21 and tax secrecy.22 Most of these practices
are offered by the intermediate countries rather than by traditional source
or residence countries.23 These practices have been criticized for jeopardizing
tax bases,24 but it is hard to eradicate them piecemeal because they often
18. Double taxation occurs in international tax when a source country and residence
country levy tax on the same declared income. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 133 (2001). Many
countries enter into income tax treaties to avoid such double taxation. Under the tax treaties,
source countries offer the reduced withholding tax rates for aliens’ income from domestic
sources, whereas residence countries offer tax exemption or credit to foreign-source income.
See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS ¶ 1240, at 63 (4th ed.
2011).
19. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games, 146 TAX
NOTES 615, 616 (2015).
20. See infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.2.
21. OECD defines a hybrid mismatch arrangement as “a profit shifting arrangement
that utili[z]es a hybrid element in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument to produce a
mismatch in tax outcomes in respect of a payment that is made under that arrangement.”
OECD, BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS
(RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOMESTIC LAWS) 8 (2014); see infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.2.
22. See infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.1.
23. See Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection
at Source Is the Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535, 543–44 (2012).
24. See, e.g., Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An
Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J. 65, 66 (2014). See generally
OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5–2015 REPORT (2015), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.
org/taxation/countering-harmful-tax-practices-more-effectively-taking-into-accounttransparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report_9789264241190-en [https://perma.cc/
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comply with legitimate tax rules of the intermediate countries. Thus, instead
of attacking individual planning techniques one by one, a new, systematic
approach to international fund investment is needed.
Recognizing this need to develop a general rule of pass-through taxation in
multinational fund investments, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) has attempted to develop one since the 1990s.
The first outcome, released in 1999, is the OECD Partnership Report, which
did not address the problem because it still tried to apply traditional bilateral
rules to more complicated situations.25 Then, the OECD released a report
on Collective Investment Vehicles (CIVs), which refers to mutual funds,
in 2010.26 However, the report did not address non-CIV funds, such as private
equity or hedge funds, that are of this Article’s interest. In 2016, as part of
its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project,27 the OECD began
discussing non-CIV funds.28
The bright side of these efforts is that the OECD is endeavoring to accomplish
tax neutrality in multinational fund investment. For example, a discussion
9UEF-LAKN]; OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS,
ACTION 2–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/715eutralizingthe-effects-of-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-action-2-2015-final-report_9789264241138en#page1 [https://perma.cc/SRK3-CHHR]; OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY
BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), https://
read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriatecircumstances-action-6-2015-final-report_9789264241695-en [https://perma.cc/V76G-496D].
25. See generally OECD, THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION
TO PARTNERSHIPS (1999), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/the-application-of-theoecd-model-tax-convention-to-partnerships_9789264173316-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/
S3FH-ZBS6]; OECD, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships,
in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, at R(15)-1 (2012), https://
read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2010_
9789264175181-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/C4SR-APMR] [hereinafter OECD, PARTNERSHIP
REPORT].
26. See generally OECD, The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income
of Collective Investment Vehicles, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
2010, supra note 25, at R(24)-1 [hereinafter OECD, CIV REPORT].
27. Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax strategies that enable
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to avoid paying tax on their global income to any country,
or only to pay tax at nominal rates, by eroding their tax base through generating—
or double-dipping—deductions or credits, or by shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions.
See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 5–6 (2013), https://read.oecdilibrary.org/taxation/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#page7
[https://perma.cc/6EMV-ACSW]. G20 and the OECD regarded this problem seriously and
launched a project to address it through global cooperation in February 2013. See id.
28. See, e.g., OECD, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT: TREATY ENTITLEMENT OF NONCIV FUNDS (2016), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/BEPS-consultation-treaty-entitlementnon-CIV-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K8U-H3NY] [hereinafter OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION
DRAFT]; see also OECD, BEPS ACTION 6: DISCUSSION DRAFT ON NON-CIV EXAMPLES
(2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/Discussion-draft-non-CIV-examples.pdf [https://
perma.cc/74FF-38H2] [hereinafter OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES].
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draft on the OECD’s policy for non-CIV funds suggests that as long as a
fund distributes 100% of its income to its investors on a regular basis, its
tax consequences would be eliminated.29 Jointly, the tax consequences of
the investors would be determined by considering only the source country
and residence country.30 However, the discussion regarding both CIV and
non-CIV funds is limited to only the tax treaty entitlement issue. Tax treaties,
for instance, are an important source of international tax law. Yet, when
the fund investment is spread across multiple countries, it is highly likely
that at least some of the countries do not have treaty networks with other
countries involved in the investment structure. Focusing on treaty entitlement
may resolve the treaty shopping issue, but that is only a partial solution to
the overall problem of multinational indirect investment.
Furthermore, the OECD’s approach basically gives intermediate countries
primary authority to determine overall tax consequences of non-CIV funds,
collect tax on behalf of both the source and residence countries, and then
remit the tax to each of them.31 Its approach requests the source and residence
countries to comply with the so-determined result. However, considering
that many aggressive tax planning techniques—such as the treaty shopping,
hybrid mismatches, and secrecy discussed above—are mostly offered by
the intermediate countries themselves, it is difficult to justify their primary
taxing power in multinational fund investment.
This Article offers a new alternative proposal (the Proposal) for nonCIV funds. Under the Proposal, as long as a fund distributes 100% of its
income to its investors, it shall qualify for international pass-through taxation.
The source country and residence country shall determine whether the fund
is qualified for such international pass-through taxation. These countries
shall each collect tax as if the investment was made directly from the residence
country to the source country. Multinational indirect investors will achieve
tax-neutral consequences, just as if they had invested directly. Intermediate
countries are required to cooperate in the process. The end result of the
Proposal would be the same as that of the OECD’s approach, but the Proposal
serves as a more effective alternative because it grants the primary right
to tax to source and residence countries that are entitled to the tax, rather
than the countries interposed between them. In that regard, the Proposal for

29. See OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 10.
30. This is called a “Global Streamed Fund” regime. Id.; see infra notes 225–32
and accompanying text.
31. See infra Section IV.C.
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pass-through taxation is a multilateral approach that looks through intermediate
countries—an approach not available in the traditional model built upon
bilateral tax treaties.
To further illustrate the feasibility of the Proposal, this Article describes
how the Proposal will be implemented with respect to PEFs. PEFs, which
are essentially privately held partnerships, are a representative example of
the non-CIV investment vehicle.32 Because PEFs often involve multiple
layers of pass-through entities and corporate-type special purpose vehicles
spread across multiple jurisdictions, they are less transparent to the public
than FDI and CIVs, and the information is less available even to the domestic
regulatory agencies because reporting requirements have been limited.33
However, if the administrative authorities tried to obtain information on
the individual investors behind the investment vehicles, it would be easier
to do so for PEFs than for CIVs. This is because PEFs tend to have only
a handful of high-profile investors, who rarely change during the lifetime
of a fund,34 “while CIVs generally have many more, including private retail
investors.”35 Information on such investors are now more available to
governments through public and private databases as well as the newly
enhanced exchange of tax information system.36
Considering that a prerequisite to implementing pass-through taxation
is for the relevant tax authority to look through the fund vehicle and obtain
the information of the investors behind the vehicle, PEFs with a small and
manageable number of investors relative to CIVs allow for pass-through
taxation because of the possibility of collecting the relevant information
for source and residence countries. Thus, it may make sense to begin with
PEFs—perhaps as “low-hanging fruit”—in engineering pass-through taxation
in international tax.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines tax neutrality between
direct and indirect investments in a domestic tax system. It also explains
why tax neutrality should be a normative goal for fund investment internationally.
Part III analyzes the challenges in taxing multinational fund investments
32. See Kim, supra note 8, at 427–29.
33. See Sanchirico, supra note 2, at 264–65. However, the Dodd-Frank Act now
imposes disclosure requirement on the managers of hedge funds, private equity funds, and
venture capital funds. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of U.S. Code); ELI TALMOR & FLORIN VASVARI, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY 17 (2011).
34. Interest in PEFs is “an intrinsically illiquid asset class” so that partners in PEFs
rarely change during the lifetime of PEFs. See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 33, at 187.
Although the recent development of the secondary market for trading interests in PEFs to
provide liquidity will give greater complexity, it is still true that the change in partners is
relatively less common in PEFs than in CIVs. See id.
35. Kim, supra note 8, at 447.
36. See infra Section V.A.
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and shows how and why tax neutrality fails for multinational fund investments
using three paradigm cases. Part IV reviews the efforts to develop a general
rule of pass-through taxation. It also develops the Proposal for non-CIV
funds. Part V offers the prospect of implementing the Proposal in the case
of PEFs. It presents empirical data on the number of investors in PEFs.
Finally, Part VI concludes with suggestions for the future.
II. TAX NEUTRALITY FOR FUND INVESTMENTS
This Part examines what tax neutrality between direct and indirect investment
means and why it should be a normative goal for taxing both domestic and
multinational fund investments. To help understand the rules for fund
investment, this Article introduces three paradigm cases.
A. Outline of the Paradigm Cases
Paradigm Case 1.1 is the case of purely pooling capital from multiple
investors via a “pass-through entity,” such as a partnership, limited partnership,
or in some cases, a limited liability company (LLC). Pass-through entities
of this kind are typically not taxable entities.37
Paradigm Case 1.2 involves the use of a special purpose company (SPC)
or “holding company” as an investment vehicle. Such a company does not
have substance but is established for the special purpose of that particular
investment, such as acquiring a target company.38 An SPC is, in principle,
a taxable entity as a corporation, subject to comprehensive entity-level
taxation. However, if certain requirements with respect to purpose, operation,
or activities are met, an SPC’s income is fully exempt. That is, it is treated
as a conduit and disregarded for tax purposes.
Paradigm Case 1.3 is a combination of cases 1.1 and 1.2. Here, the passthrough vehicle is established to pool the capital from multiple investors,
and such a vehicle establishes a holding company for specific investment
purposes.
In all three cases, the target company is the only entity that is generating
of the target company relating to its business but on the investment by,
and distribution to the investors via, investment vehicles. This Article will
analyze such tax consequences, implications, and the problems of each
37.
38.

See RICHARD M. LIPTON ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 5 (2d ed. 2008).
ROLF EICKE, REPATRIATION OF US PROFITS FROM EUROPE: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES,
STRUCTURES 37 (2009).

719

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470429

POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/15/2019 10:18 AM

Paradigm Case under the three jurisdictional models—single, bilateral,
and multinational—step by step.
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B. Domestic Tax Rules
Domestic tax policy with respect to fund investments is designed to
eliminate double taxation so as to accomplish tax neutrality between direct
investment and indirect investment.
1. Paradigm Case 1.1: Pass-Through Vehicle
Paradigm Case 1.1 involves a pass-through entity, typically a partnership,
to pool capital from multiple investors. In the United States, as a general rule,
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) does not view a partnership as a separate
taxable entity but treats it as a pass-through entity in which its owners—
partners—not the partnership itself, are subject to tax.39 Of course, it is possible
to tax partnerships themselves, and some foreign countries currently tax
partnerships as taxable business entities.40 However, unless every business
entity of any size or any formation is subject to entity-level taxation, there
will always be certain types of business entities that are “effectively taxed
to their owners directly and not to the entity itself.”41 Paradigm Case 1.1 deals
with business entities of this kind, whether called partnerships or something
else.
The effect of the pass-through regime can be justified from the efficiency
perspective insofar as it eliminates double taxation in the indirect investment
structure—taxing both the entity and the investor—and thus accomplishes
neutrality between direct investment, in which the investors invest in the target
directly, and indirect investment, in which the investors invest in the target
through intermediary business entities.42
39. LIPTON ET AL., supra note 37, at 5.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. In domestic tax literature, it is explained as minimizing “the role of taxes on the
choice of the form [of entities].” STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS
OF CORPORATE TAXATION 5 (9th ed. 2016). With no double taxation, investing through
a pass-through entity was preferred to a taxable corporation before the TCJA. However,
the TCJA reduced the statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%; thus, investing
through a taxable corporation can sometimes be better than investing directly, at least
domestically, especially if distributions from a taxable corporation will be deferred for a
period of years. Franklin, supra note 16. In other words, the corporate tax rate cut reduces the
tax burden at the entity level, the deferral in effect halts the tax burden at the investor level,
and the overall effective tax rate would be 21%. However, the pass-through investment is
usually required to promptly distribute funds to investors, and, thus, there will be
immediate taxation at the investor level. Assuming that an investor is an individual and the
top marginal tax rate for an individual is 37%, the overall effective tax rate would be 37%.
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2. Paradigm Case 1.2: Holding Company
Paradigm Case 1.2 involves an SPC. An SPC is, in principle, a taxable
entity as a corporation, such that investments through an SPC entail double
taxation—once at the entity level, and once at the shareholder level. If certain
requirements are met, however, the SPC is treated as a conduit and
disregarded for tax purposes.43
Even where the SPC is disregarded for tax purposes, it is still bankruptcyremote and respected as a separate entity from investors for corporate law
purposes, unless the corporate shell is denied by corporate law principles
such as piercing the corporate veil.44 Hence, the difference between Paradigm
Cases 1.1 and 1.2 is that the investment vehicle for the former case is transparent
for both tax and corporate law purposes, while the vehicle for the latter
case is usually transparent for tax purposes but not transparent for corporate
law purposes.
3. Paradigm Case 1.3: Combined Structure
Paradigm Case 1.3 combines Paradigm Cases 1.1 and 1.2. For fund
investment, such as investment via CIVs or non-CIVs, Paradigm Case 1.3
is the most common structure. Here, the pass-through vehicle is established
to pool the capital from multiple investors. This vehicle then establishes
a holding company by which the investment, such as acquiring a target
company, is made. The investment proceeds generated by the target company
will flow through the holding company and the pass-through entity until
they reach investors.
The key tax consideration here is to keep entity-level tax away. This
is due to the indirect investment technique being derived from partnership

Therefore, in today’s rate environment, investing through an entity treated as a corporation
might actually be more favorable than investing directly. Nonetheless, this explanation
on comparing taxable corporations and pass-through entities for tax purposes does not uphold in
the multi-jurisdictional analysis, especially when the intermediary entity is usually required
to promptly distribute funds. See id. Thus, Section II.B. intends to offer a general explanation
of domestic tax rules for fund investments as a groundwork before discussing international
taxation, rather than addressing a transitional phenomenon caused by the tax rate change in
the TCJA.
43. See generally Brad A. Birmingham & James M. Bandoblu, Jr., Disregarded Entities:
To Be or Not to Be?, 11 BUS. ENTITIES 12 (2009). One of the most popular requirements
is the minimum distribution to the shareholders or investors, such as distributing more than
90% of proceeds to shareholders every year. Eric M. Zolt, Taxation of Investment Funds,
in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING ch. 22, at 5 n.14 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1998). The
rationale behind the policy to acknowledge conduits as a disregarded entity in the investment
structure is to reduce the economic distortion. Id.
44. See William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. Rev. 237, 268–70 (2007).
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investment with the aim of taking advantage of pooling capital while
eliminating double taxation. The pass-through entity is not subject to tax
from the beginning. As long as the SPC qualifies as a conduit that is not subject
to tax, the goal of eliminating entity-level taxation can be achieved.
In sum, domestic tax policy with respect to pass-through entities or SPCs
is designed to eliminate entity-level taxation, accomplishing tax neutrality
between direct investment and indirect investment. An important rationale is
that it is not necessary to impose double taxation in such an investment
structure because its commercial function and character are different from
those of the corporate regime, and that it is nonetheless beneficial to allow
a fiscally transparent entity for the purpose of pooling capital as a means
to raise funds on a large scale.45
C. Tax Neutrality and International Fund Investments
Now let us expand the picture into international settings and discuss
what would be a proper international tax policy for fund investments.
Because examining how domestic tax law is designed for three Paradigm
Cases offers insight into the normative framework for international tax
policy, this Article argues that international tax policy should also seek to
achieve tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect investment.
Tax neutrality generally means the absence of tax-related distortion affecting
decision-making between different types of investment, such as FDI and
foreign indirect investment.46 Thus, if the features of international investment
funds are functionally equivalent to the investments through a partnership
or a pass-through entity, eliminating entity-level taxation of investment funds
even in the international setting and taxing investors only would be a proper
policy for foreign indirect investment.47 The OECD also endorses the tax
neutrality between direct and indirect investment in the international setting.48
Domestic tax rules offer a way to achieve the goal of tax neutrality
by eliminating entity-level taxation for indirect investments through passthrough tax regime or partnership tax.49 The goal of tax neutrality is also being
45.
46.
47.

See, e.g., LIPTON ET AL., supra note 37, at 7.
OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at 3–4.
See generally OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT USER’S TOOLKIT:
CHAPTER 5. TAX POLICY (2013), http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/41890309.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AU2Q-3SKZ] [hereinafter OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK].
48. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-10 to -11, R(24)-17 to -19.
49. OECD, Commentaries on Articles of the Model Tax Convention, in MODEL TAX
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, supra note 25, at C(1), C(1)-5 [hereinafter
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achieved in relatively simple cross-border transactions if only two jurisdictions
are involved. As shown in Part III, however, the goal is not achieved
in multinational settings where more than two countries are involved. For
those cases, this Article’s proposed approach will help achieve the tax
neutrality of multinational fund investments by way of overcoming the opacity
of the intermediary in the investment structure and finding the ultimate
investors in the residence country.
III. FAILED TAX NEUTRALITY FOR MULTINATIONAL FUND
INVESTMENTS
This Part examines the challenges that the current international tax regime
faces in taxing fund investments. Using three paradigm cases, this Part also
examines how and why tax neutrality fails for multinational fund investments.
A. Overview of Inadequate Rules and Harmful Practices
Most observers would likely agree that a tax system should provide a
valid set of guidelines to distinguish legitimate tax planning from tax avoidance
and to prevent the latter, which harms tax efficiency and equity.50 However,
too often a gray area exists in which aggressive tax planning can occur. Most
of the time, aggressive tax planning results from the fact that the law is not
simple, clear, and coherent, or because the law does not always keep pace
with changes in the world.51
The international tax regime, which is embodied in the network of tax
treaties and the domestic international tax law of major trading countries,52
has been notorious for not providing such a guideline for a number of reasons.

OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010] (explaining that the goal of a domestic tax system
dealing with indirect investment is “to provide tax neutrality between direct investments
and investments through a [vehicle],” so the investment vehicles for such indirect investment
are usually a pass-through entity, which is not subject to entity level taxation).
50. Two widely accepted criteria for a good tax system are efficiency and equity.
Some tax scholars consider simplicity as an additional criterion for a good tax system, and
provide three criteria: efficiency, equity, and simplicity. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH
H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27–30 (7th ed. 2013).
51. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING INDICATORS FINAL
REPORT 22–23 (2017), https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Study-on-ATPindicators.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4QC-P374] (providing evidence of the aggressive tax planning
structures in Europe).
52. There is a debate on whether an international tax regime even exists. See REUVEN
S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TAX REGIME 1 (2007). In this regard, I assume for my purposes that there is an international
tax regime in the form of the network of tax treaties and domestic international tax law of
various countries.
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First, this body of law has a relatively short history of full-fledged development
compared to the long and rich history of domestic tax law. The modern
international tax rules have their roots in model bilateral income tax treaties
drafted in the early twentieth century under the auspices of the League of
Nations.53 Despite the short history, these model treaties have served as
the foundation for more than 2,000 bilateral income tax treaties in force
throughout the world.54 The main purposes of such model treaties are to
allocate the tax jurisdictions among countries and to eliminate potential
double taxation on the same income by the source country and the residence
country.55 But these treaties only provide the rough principle of allocation,
under which business income is primarily taxed by the source country and
portfolio income by the residence country.56
Second, notwithstanding its short history, the principles and concepts of
the international tax regime have not been updated adequately to keep pace
with rapid changes.57 The formative period of international tax principles
and concepts was 1918–28.58 Clearly, in that era, there was no e-commerce,
no financial derivatives, far less mobility of capital across borders, far less
developed emergence of tax havens, and less sophisticated cross-border
investment structures.
One reason for this delay in reforming the international tax regime lies
in the fact that the primary source of law is bilateral income tax treaties,
which can be much harder to amend than domestic tax laws.59 Moreover,
it is difficult to reach a global consensus on the direction nations wish to
advance. For instance, developed countries and developing countries have
different interests. Nearly every country, meanwhile, has different ideas
about how international tax law should be revised. Furthermore, although
one country may decide to revise its own international tax law and treaties

53. See id. at 182.
54. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1023 (1997); see also Graetz, supra note 12,
at 262.
55. Double taxation here refers to the exercise of tax jurisdiction twice—one by the
source country and the other by the residence country. See supra note 18. This is different
from double taxation that occurs due to the entity level taxation, such corporate tax—one
at the entity level and the other at the investor level. See OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra
note 47, at 23, 34.
56. Graetz, supra note 12, at 262.
57. See id. at 262–63.
58. Id. at 315–16.
59. See id. at 261–62.
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in its own way, it cannot deviate too much from the global standard due to
a concern for reciprocity.60
The above is a basic picture of the challenges under the traditional
international tax regime. The next question is how such challenges are
amplified in the era of a globalized economy with more sophisticated investment
techniques, particularly in the context of multinational fund investments.
1. Over-Taxation
The current international tax regime built upon bilateral tax treaties may
result in over-taxation for investors in multinational fund investments. This
over-taxation occurs—relative to direct investment—essentially because
investors may not claim treaty benefits mitigating double taxation by source
country and residence country, which would normally be available through
direct investment.61 The opacity of fund vehicles in intermediate countries
makes it difficult to look-through the vehicles and see investors in residence
countries as income is distributed from the source country.
A possible solution for such over-taxation might be to allow treaty benefits
to investors and every fund vehicle in intermediate countries. However,
this solution is difficult to attain for the following reasons.
First, tax treaties, which provide the most important rules for taxing crossborder transactions, are by nature bilateral.62 These treaties are limited in
their ability to resolve the frequent cases that involve more than two
jurisdictions. In these cases, the investors, investment, and investment vehicles
are each located in three or more different countries. Pass-through vehicles
are mainly domiciled in countries that do not have an extensive tax treaty
network.63 Such non-treaty countries then cut the chain of bilateral tax
treaties from investors in the residence country through the investment in
the source country. This omission makes it difficult for investors to claim
treaty benefits. Without a tax treaty, investors must resort to the domestic
tax law of each country involved, but, ironically, domestic tax law largely
parallels tax treaties, and thus does not help resolve these complicated cases.
Second, even if an intermediate country has a tax treaty with a source
country or residence country, it is not entirely clear whether a multinational
fund vehicle is entitled to treaty benefits under the current international
60. See id. at 300. An important function of international tax law is to eliminate
international double taxation, which can effectively be eliminated by reciprocally respected
international tax principles. See id. However, if one country acts arbitrarily, it breaks the
balance of reciprocity and comity, causing antagonism from the global community, with
possible retaliation in various ways. See id.
61. Warren, supra note 18, at 137.
62. See id. 132–34.
63. See infra Section III.C.1.
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tax regime.64 Despite the increasing volume of cross-border investments
through multinational funds, existing bilateral tax treaties, as well as the
OECD’s Model Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
(OECD Model), do not contain specific provisions relating to whether such
fund vehicles are entitled to treaty benefits.65 Thus, the traditional rule simply
relies on general principles or theories of international tax law. Under these
traditional principles, a fund should be: (1) a person, (2) a resident of a country
which has a tax treaty with the source country, and (3) the beneficial owner
of the income it receives.66 However, in many cases, the treaty entitlement of a
fund vehicle would be challenged with respect to the residence requirement
and the beneficial ownership requirements.
Third, the existing rule only provides for binary all-or-nothing application
of the treaty to the fund vehicles.67 In other words, under the current system,
an entity receives either: (1) full treaty benefits, if it meets all requirements
for treaty benefits, or (2) no treaty benefits, if it fails to meet even one
requirement.68 Therefore, if a fund vehicle is not entitled to treaty benefits,
the traditional rule merely creates a cliff by denying the treaty benefits to
investors, who otherwise would have been entitled to treaty benefits, had
they received the income directly from the source country.69 As a result,
investors in the funds, or indirect investors, in other words, are placed in
a worse position than they would be in the case of direct investment. This
does not serve the goal of tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect
investment.70
In short, the traditional international tax rules do not provide sufficient
guidance to determine coherent tax consequences once treaty benefits have
been denied to multinational funds. In contrast, domestic tax law, when
it challenges the tax consequences of original transactions by applying antiavoidance rules, has mechanisms to determine the adjusted tax consequences

64. Treaty benefits typically refer that certain types of income, such as dividends, interest,
rentals, royalties, pensions, and annuities, received by a resident of a contracting state may
be exempt from tax of the other contracting state or may be subject to a reduced rate of tax
of the other contracting state. See, e.g., OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra note 47, at 34.
65. See generally OECD, Model Convention, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL 2010, supra note 25, at M-3 [hereinafter OECD Model 2010].
66. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
67. See id. at R(24)-19.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. This problem also applies to FPI using CIVs. See OECD, Commentaries on Model
2010, supra note 49, para. 6.8, at C(1)-5.

727

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470429

POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/15/2019 10:18 AM

by recasting the transaction so as to systematically conform to the integrated
tax system.71 As a result, the lack of such rules that adjust tax consequences
after a denial of tax benefits remains a huge defect of the international tax
regime.
2. Under-Taxation
To avoid the over-taxation described above, multinational funds have
developed many tax-planning techniques to reduce tax liability in relevant
countries. This Subsection discusses the potential under-taxation problem
arising from treaty shopping and hybrid mismatch.
First, taxpayers may achieve under-taxation in a source country through
treaty shopping.72 Treaty shopping generally refers to a situation where
taxpayers take advantage of more favorable tax treaties between a source
country and certain jurisdictions other than their residence country.73 In most
multinational fund investment structures, the intermediate country where
holding companies are located offers such an opportunity.74 Here, treaty
benefits mean reduced withholding tax rates under a tax treaty so taxpayers
may reduce tax liability in source country by shopping favorable treaties.75
The reduced tax liability in the source country may result in an outcome better
than the tax-neutral benchmark, especially because many investors in
multinational funds are tax-exempt organizations in the residence country;
the structure of these organizations is irrelevant to the tax liability in the
residence country.76 Even if an investor is not exempted from tax in the
residence country, such reduced taxation in the source country may result
in overall under-taxation because the investor may not claim full foreign
tax credit in the residence country.77
Second, taxpayers may achieve under-taxation in residence country via
hybrid mismatches—using a hybrid instrument or entity that produces a
71. See OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra note 47, at 13–14, 19–21, 26. The result
of such adjustment is most likely unfavorable to the taxpayers, but there are cases that the
outcome is similar to, or even more favorable than, the original transaction. Of course, the latter
seldom happens because such possibility that challenging the original tax position will lead
to more favorable tax consequences to the taxpayer would function as a negative factor
in deciding whether the original transaction would be a tax avoidance or not.
72. See Kenneth A. Grady, Comment, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview
of Prevention Techniques, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 626, 627–28 (1983).
73. Id. at 627.
74. Wells & Lowell, supra note 23, at 543–44.
75. Grady, supra note 72, at 627–28.
76. Although tax-exempt organizations are exempted from tax in the residence
country, they are subject to tax in the source country, including withholding tax in tax treaties.
See Tax Treaties, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/internationaltaxpayers/tax-treaties [https://perma.cc/9XDF-PX22] (last updated Dec. 18, 2018).
77. See infra Section III.C.3, Part VII.
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mismatch in tax treatment in different countries.78 The primary purpose
of the hybrid mismatch is to eliminate entity-level taxation in intermediate
countries.79 Eliminating entity-level taxation itself may not be considered
harmful because it makes the tax consequences in intermediate countries
equivalent to the tax-neutral benchmark. However, taxpayers may further
achieve under-taxation in the residence country through hybrid mismatch.
For example, a hybrid instrument may convert the ordinary income in the
source or intermediate country into dividends or capital gains in the residence
country. Because many countries provide preferential tax rates to dividends
or capital gains, such conversion may reduce tax liability in the residence
country.80
Interestingly, hybrid mismatch and the resulting low taxes in intermediate
countries make it difficult for some source countries to respect the treaty
shopping structure.81 As discussed in Sections B and C, whether an entity
is liable to pay substantial tax in its residence country is a crucial factor to
entitle treaty benefits. If a fund vehicle pays substantial tax to the intermediate
country, the source country is more likely to respect the tax treaty with that
country even if it is treaty shopping. Due to the minimal tax in intermediate
country, however, several source countries challenge the treaty benefits in
this case and recast the transaction as a non-treaty case. That puts much
worse tax consequences on investors than a tax-neutral benchmark, as in
the over-taxation case. Appendix A briefly shows this result in hypothetical
problems.
International tax rules for multinational fund investments should provide
rules not only to analyze entities in each layer separately but also to analyze
the ultimate investors. Such rules also should address the treaty benefit
analysis on the overall investment structure spanning the multiple jurisdictions.
However, the existing regime does not provide clear guidance on these issues,
especially about how to deal with the investors behind an investment vehicle
78. See supra notes 21, 24.
79. See infra Section III.C.2.
80. Furthermore, if the taxpayer is a tax-exempt organization, the hybrid instrument
may convert unrelated taxable business income into passive investment income that is exempted
from taxation for such organization, resulting in the under-taxation in the residence country.
See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TREATMENT
OF BUSINESS DEBT 66, 77, 85 (2001).
81. See, e.g., Sebastian Beer, Ruud A. de Mooij & Li Liu, International Corporate
Tax Avoidance: A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes, and Blind Spots 28 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No., 2018) (explaining that MNEs exploit mismatches in national tax
rules, allowing them to treaty shop in countries with more favorable tax rates).
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which is found not to be entitled to treaty benefits. This lack of guidance
puts investors at a worse level than the tax-neutral benchmark; it harms
the tax neutrality of the indirect investment.
The problem becomes more puzzling if there are a number of intermediaries
in multiple jurisdictions, and it becomes even more complicated when some
of the investors are funds or institutional investors rather than individuals,
making it more challenging to determine the ultimate investors.
Recognizing the lack of rules and flaws in cross-border indirect investment
in multinational situation, the OECD82 and the International Fiscal Association
(IFA)83 have released several reports on the matter. Two such reports—
the OECD Partnership Report and the CIV Report—will be discussed in
detail in Part IV. The essence of their suggestions is that many investment
vehicles or entities themselves will be entitled to treaty benefits, but even
if the entities are not so qualified, investors in such entities should be able
to claim benefits.
The policy goal of such reports is to achieve tax neutrality between direct
investment and indirect investment in international transactions. However,
the OECD and IFA reports limited the scope of their suggestions to CIVs,84
and they did not consider “issues of treaty entitlement with respect to investments
through private equity funds, hedge funds or trusts or other entities” until the
OECD released a discussion draft in 2017 regarding those funds excluded
in the CIV Report, called non-CIVs.85
Such explicit exclusion of non-CIVs provoked me to embark on this
Article. The current international tax regime, based on bilateral solutions,

82. For OECD’s discussion, see generally OECD, FIRST MEETING OF THE INFORMAL
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES (2007);
OECD, REPORT OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE
INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS
ON THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF COLLECTIVE
INVESTMENT VEHICLES (2009); OECD, TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT:
MUTUAL FUNDS AND POSSIBLE TAX DISTORTIONS (1999); OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note
26.
83. For IFA’s discussion, see generally 73 INT’L FISCAL ASS’N, STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL
FISCAL LAW:51ST CONGRESS OFTHE INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION,NEW DELHI 1997 (1997).
84. Collective Investment Vehicles in the literatures of the OECD are an equivalent
concept to mutual fund or “regulated investment companies” (RIC) under the Internal Revenue
Code. See I.R.C. § 851(f)(1) (2012); OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-3.
85. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-4; see supra note 28. The OECD
CIV Report does not explain why it excludes non-CIV funds from its scope. However, in
a subsequent document, the OECD explains that the conclusion in the CIV report cannot
apply to the “policy considerations relevant to the treaty entitlement of non-CIV funds.”
OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES,
ACTION 6–2015 FINAL REPORT, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT
15 (2015). This implies that the nature of non-CIV funds are distinguished from that of
CIV funds. See generally Kim, supra note 8.
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lacks the proper rules and policy to deal with non-CIVs as well. In 2017,
the OECD released discussion drafts on non-CIV funds as part of its BEPS
Project, but the scope remains limited to treaty entitlement.86 In treaty
shopping, investors in non-CIVs often structure transactions aggressively
to exploit the limits of bilateral solutions. They also often achieve low taxation
compared to the hypothetical tax liability if they had invested directly. This
behavior poses a major problem relating to non-CIV fund investments.
However, the problems indeed go beyond treaty shopping. The bilateral
approach also allows source countries to challenge the transactions, in which
case the tax burdens increase exponentially, because the countries challenging
the transactions may not consider multinational dimensions of their tax
policy. Neither of these cases is desirable, because both diverge from
tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect investment. Furthermore,
hybrid mismatch and tax secrecy relating to intermediary jurisdictions play
an important role to harm tax neutrality. Section B discusses the problems
of current bilateral approaches that occur when participants apply bilateral
tax treaties to multinational fund investment. More detailed analysis on
the inadequacy of current rules for non-CIVs takes place in Section C.
B. Application of Bilateral Tax Treaties to Fund Investment
This Section analyzes how the international tax regime—again, which
developed based on bilateral solutions—applies to globalized investment
funds. In the bilateral jurisdictional frame, two countries are involved: the
source country and the residence country. The international tax consequences
are determined basically under the domestic tax laws of the two countries,
unless an applicable tax treaty modifies the tax result.87 When a domestic
tax code provision conflicts with the applicable tax treaty, many countries
solve such conflicts by considering the treaty a higher source of law than
a statute.88
86. See generally OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28.
87. The Internal Revenue Code provisions “shall be applied to any taxpayer with due
regard to any treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer.” I.R.C.
§ 894(a)(1).
88. See id. § 7852(d)(1). However, under the U.S. Constitution, “U.S. treaties and
federal statues have equal status as the supreme law of the land and, thus, whenever there
is a conflict between the two, the later in time prevails.” GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra
note 18, ¶ 1295, at 73 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). Therefore, there are many cases
where newly enacted legislation that is inconsistent with the existing tax treaty provision will
prevail, which is called the “treaty override.” See id. However, in many instances new legislation
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Therefore, in the bilateral jurisdictions frame, it is imperative to determine
whether a tax treaty is applicable to the transaction at issue. With respect
to the treaty application, the key question is whether the investment funds
in question are entitled to the treaty benefits.
Existing bilateral tax treaties as well as the OECD Model do not contain
specific provisions relating to whether fund vehicles are entitled to treaty
benefits. Thus, the traditional rule simply relies on general principles
of international tax law, by which an investment fund should be (1) a person,
(2) a resident of a country which has a tax treaty with the source country,
and (3) the beneficial owner of the income it receives.89
Although there are three prongs, the existing tests mainly focus on the
second prong—whether the entity pays taxes to the alleged residence country.
For example, with respect to the issue of residency, Article 4(1) of the OECD
Model defines the resident of a contracting state as “any person who, under
the laws of that state, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence,
place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature.”90 Furthermore,
in making a determination regarding beneficial ownership, the Commentaries
on the Articles of the OECD Model provide that if the recipient of the income
is liable to pay taxes to the residence country, there remains a potential
risk of double taxation, so the recipient should be treated as the beneficial
owner of such income. In contrast, if the recipient is not liable for taxes,
there is no potential double taxation and no need to see the recipient as the
beneficial owner of such income.91
As such, both residency and beneficial ownership tests rely on whether
the entity pays taxes in the alleged residence country. With regard to such
a single criterion as whether or not a person has tax liability, residency is
determined by the residence country. By contrast, beneficial ownership is
determined by the source country. As a result, the source country and the
residence country interpret or apply a treaty to the fund in different ways.
Furthermore, the existing rules do not answer the question of how to treat
an investment vehicle, which is in principle subject to taxation but remains
exempt for the purpose of domestic tax policy.

is not intended to override a treaty, and Congress makes it clear that the new tax provisions
should be interpreted harmoniously with existing tax treaties. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (AM. LAW INS. 1987).
89. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
90. OECD, ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL art. 4, § 1 (2003) (emphasis added), https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7F2C-QSJ8].
91. Even though the immediate recipient of the income qualifies as a resident, “no
potential double taxation arises as a consequence of that status since the recipient is not treated
as the owner of the income for tax purposes in the State of residence.” OECD, Commentaries
on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 12.1, at C(10)-3.
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Considering that the OECD has released reports dealing with CIVs and
non-CIVs separately, I will review the traditional rule for these two types
of vehicles separately as well.
1. Existing Rule for CIVs
The legal forms of CIVs, such as mutual funds, vary from country to country.
Most of them can be classified as: (1) a corporation or company, (2) a
trust, or (3) a partnership.92 Sometimes, the determination of each CIV’s
legal form based on the entity classification theory is the preliminary issue
in the application of tax treaties. Once the entity is classified, however,
the tax treatment of such CIVs differs depending on the tax laws93 and treaties
of countries. The absence of a unified treatment of CIVs gives rise to undesirable
situations, including double taxation or double non-taxation in the international
regime.
The OECD and IFA have made efforts to cope with these problems by
allowing treaty benefits to CIVs, but their existing studies reveal limits on
resolving the fundamental problems.
First, it is not clear whether every type of CIV can be regarded as a person.
According to the definition of a “person” in the OECD Model,94 a CIV
taking the form of a company would satisfy the requirement of a legal person.95
However, it remains unclear whether trusts and partnerships would fall
under this definition.96
92. For example, the United Kingdom has Authorized Unit Trust as a trust-type entity
and Open-Ended Investment Company as a corporate-type entity. António Calisto Pato,
Cross-Border Direct Tax Issues of Investment Funds from the Perspective of European Law 8
(Aug. 15, 2007) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Leiden) (on file with University of
Leiden). The U.S. law allows CIVs to take any form among corporations, business trusts, or
limited partnerships. In addition, Unit Trust as a close-ended investment fund can take the
form of a trust. See TOMI VIITALA, TAXATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 35 (2005); Pato, supra, at 8.
93. In many cases, the issue is affected by the source country’s concept of beneficial
ownership, which is often not defined by code. See Pato, supra note 92, at 11.
94. Because Article 3, section 1(a) of the OECD Model defines a person as “an
individual, a company and any other body of persons,” and the term “company” is further
defined in section 1(b) as “any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate
for tax purposes,” a CIV which takes the form of a company would satisfy the requirement
of a person. OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 3, § 1(a)–(b), at M-9.
95. Lynn J. Ed & Paul J.M. Bongaarts, General Report, in STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL
FISCAL LAW: 51ST CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION, NEW DELHI
1997, supra note 83, at 21, 43.
96. VIITALA, supra note 92, at 81.
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Second, according to the definition of a resident in the OECD Model,97
a CIV that takes the form of a pass-through entity would easily be excluded
from the definition of a “resident” because it is not liable for taxes in the
residence country.98 By contrast, if a CIV is in principle liable for taxes but
the country where it is established does not in effect impose tax, the OECD
suggests treating such CIV as a resident of that country “because the CIV
is subject to comprehensive taxation in that State.”99 However, the OECD
further notes that some contracting states may not treat such CIVs as residents
of that country for treaty purposes.100
To put the OECD position in terms more familiar from the paradigm cases:
the OECD suggests that a pass-through vehicle in Paradigm Case 1.1 may
not be treated as a resident of the country where it is established. It also suggests
that an SPC in Paradigm Case 1.2 would be treated as a resident of such
country. However, the treatment of these vehicles is still not certain.
Third, the definition of beneficial ownership perhaps poses the most difficult
issue in the application of the treaty.101 The OECD Model requires a CIV
to be a beneficial owner of capital gains102 as well as dividends103 and interest104
in order to enjoy tax treaty benefit. To satisfy the beneficial ownership
requirement, the managers of the CIV must have discretionary powers to
manage the assets generating such income.105 However, most countries are
reluctant to recognize a fund to be the beneficial owner of such incomes because
the income is mandatorily distributed or passed through to the investor,
rather than remaining in the CIV pursuant to the managers’ discretion.106
In sum, the existing studies have tried to award treaty benefits to CIVs,
but they have not found fundamental solutions under the existing rules.
Moreover, the existing literature merely suggests the principle that there should
be relief to investors when a fund fails to receive treaty benefits. However,

97. Article 4 section 1 of the OECD Model defines the resident of a contacting state
as “any person who, under the laws of that state, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile,
residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature.” See OECD Model
2010, supra note 65, art. 4, § 1.
98. The OECD CIV Report and the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model support
the same position. Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 6.11, at C(1)-6.
99. Id. para. 6.12, at C(1)-7.
100. See id. para. 6.13, at C(1)-7; see also Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 44, 45.
101. Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 45.
102. See OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 13. Although the language of Article 13
does not contain this beneficial ownership requirement, it is hard to doubt that such requirement
is also applicable to capital gains. See Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 45.
103. See OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 10.
104. See id. art. 11.
105. OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 6.14, at C(1)-7.
106. See Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 45–46.
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these studies have fallen short of making detailed proposals with respect
to what such relief should involve.
2. Existing Rule for Non-CIVs
Non-CIVs often involve multiple-tier structures with various legal entities.
Investment portfolios are generally less diversified than CIVs, and they
are also generally subject to less strict regulations.107 These characteristics
distinguish non-CIVs from CIVs. Thus, a separate study is required for the
question of whether PEFs, hedge funds, trust-types, or corporate-types of
investment vehicles are entitled to treaty benefits and, if so, how to treat
them.108
Nevertheless, there remains a shortage of studies on the issue, save for
the OECD reports on real estate investment trusts (REITs),109 sovereign
wealth funds,110 and the recent discussion draft on non-CIV funds.111 Given
the dearth of relevant research and the lack of rules applicable to nonCIVs, the existing three-prong test, which requires a fund to be a legal
person, a resident, and the beneficial owner of the foreign income it receives,112
still needs to be applied. However, under this rule, most non-CIVs are not
entitled to treaty benefits even where some or all their investors would
qualify if the investment were held directly.
Few existing studies have attempted to discuss this issue. Some have argued
that the investors, not the fund, should be treated as beneficial owners of
the income,113 and the source country should deny the alleged residency of
the fund.114 Others have proposed to treat a fund as a conduit and disregard

107. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 8, at 443.
108. See id. at 447.
109. See generally OECD, TAX TREATY ISSUES RELATED TO REITS: PUBLIC DISCUSSION
DRAFT (2007), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/39554788.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSP8-7BLF].
110. See generally OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE APPLICATION OF TAX TREATIES TO
STATE-OWNED ENTITIES, INCLUDING SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (2009), http://www.oecd.org/
ctp/treaties/44080490.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NY8-TFYG].
111. See OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28, at 1–2.
112. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
113. See, e.g., STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES: WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 91 & n.214. (1998).
114. See OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-9; cf. MICHAEL LANG,
THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION TO PARTNERSHIPS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT PREPARED BY THE OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 40–41
(2000).
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it under the substance-over-form doctrine of domestic tax law.115 Although
such studies try to overcome the current limitation by using one of the three
prongs of the existing rules, none of them suggest a coherent and allencompassing approach covering all three requirements.
3. Paradigm Cases in Bilateral Jurisdictions: Country of
Source and Country of Residence
Despite these flaws, the existing rule generally works if the fund investment
structure spreads across only two countries—in a bilateral situation—and
tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect investment is accomplished.
This is not a surprising result when one recalls that the existing international
tax rules and principles were initially developed based on bilateral solutions.
In our paradigm cases, the border may exist in the following three scenarios:
(1) between the target company and the SPC (Paradigm Case 2.1), (2)
between the SPC and the pass-through vehicle (Paradigm Case 2.2), and
(3) between the pass-through vehicle and the investors (Paradigm Case 2.3).
To simplify the analysis, let us assume there is a tax treaty between Country
A and Country B, and both countries have a tax system treating a pass-through
entity as a non-taxable entity.
In Paradigm Cases 2.1 and 2.2, it is not certain whether the SPC or the
pass-through entity are entitled to the treaty benefits discussed above.
However, such a problem is not critical in these two cases. As long as the
pass-through entity and the SPC are not subject to entity-level taxation in
domestic tax, all investors behind the investment vehicle are the residents
of Country B, where the pass-through vehicle has been established.116 As
a result, there remains no further international tax consequences between
the pass-through vehicle and the investors. Therefore, international tax
issues—such as which country has tax jurisdiction for certain income arising
from the target company; whether the source country could withhold tax
on such income; how much the tax rate would be; et cetera—would be
resolved by tax treaty.117 In addition, the tax consequences between the

115. See, e.g., Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 925, 925 (1971). Some
commentators see this case as an example of invoking judicial doctrines under domestic
law, while others see this as a teleological interpretation of tax treaties. With respect to
the former argument, see WEEGHEL, supra note 113, at 61–62. With respect to the latter
argument, see René Matteotti, Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Domestic General AntiAvoidance Rules—A Skeptical Look at the 2003 Update to the OECD Commentary, 33
INTERTAX 336, 347–49 (2005).
116. See OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-8, -13 to -14.
117. See Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the
OECD’s Campaign Against “Harmful Tax Competition,” 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 27 (2012).
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pass-through entity and the investors remain basically domestic matters.118 In
most cases, there exists no additional tax liability or consequence incurred
between them due to the partnership tax regime. In other words, the tax
consequences of Paradigm Cases 2.1 and 2.2 are the same as when each
investor in Country B directly invests in the target company in Country A.
This means there exists tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect
investment.
Moreover, Paradigm Case 2.3 does not involve the treaty entitlement
problem of investment vehicles. Cash flow from the target company to the
pass-through vehicle remains a domestic tax matter.119 However, the SPC
or pass-through vehicle gets either disregarded for tax purposes or labeled
as a non-taxable entity.120 The income received by the SPC and pass-through
vehicle would be attributed to the investors abroad,121 which entails
international tax analysis, such as withholding taxes and treaty application.
However, because the target company, SPC, and pass-through vehicle are
in the same jurisdiction, Country A will be considered a source country
regardless of the international tax implications. The tax treaty between
Country A and Country B will thus be applicable. The tax consequences
for the investors in Country B are the same as they would be in the case where
such investors directly invest in the target company in Country A.
In short, the investors in Country B in Paradigm Cases 2.1–2.3 would be
in the same tax position as they would be in the case where such investors
directly invest in the target company in Country A. That leads to the conclusion
that there would be neutrality between direct and indirect investment in a
bilateral structure.
C. Problems in Multinational Structure
In the multinational setting, at least three countries are involved: the country
where the target company is established (source country), the country where
investors are located (residence country),122 and the country where the
investment vehicle is located. To simplify the analysis, I will assume the
income distributed by the target company is in the form of passive income,
such as dividends and capital gains. The analysis here will follow the flow

118. See Jeffrey M. Colon, Foreign Investors in U.S. Mutual Funds: The Trouble with
Treaties, 35 VA. TAX REV. 483, 525 (2016).
119. See id.
120. See Birmingham & Bandoblu, supra note 43, at 18.
121. See Kim, supra note 8, at 421, 424–25.
122. Having assumed that there are more than three investors in the paradigm cases,
it is possible that each investor would be in three different countries to diversify the country of
residence as well. However, unless it is necessary, the analysis on the investor level will
be rendered for one jurisdiction among them.
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of cash, starting from the target in Country A through the pass-through entity
in Country B to the investors in Country C.123
The first problem in a multinational setting is treaty shopping. The analysis
of tax structures in a multinational setting is different from that in bilateral
setting in two ways. First, there could be multiple tax treaties potentially
available in the structure, unlike in a bilateral setting. Those tax treaties are
not identical, and they may offer different treaty benefits to investors. As a
result, investors may be motivated to choose a more favorable tax treaty. Second,
it is neither possible nor practical to assume that each country has an identical
domestic tax law for pass-through taxation. That leads to a possibility that,
although an investment vehicle is in substance fiscally transparent or a business
conduit, it can be treated as an entity that can claim treaty benefits. The
combination of these two variations gives rise to the potential for treaty
shopping.
In addition to the treaty shopping, two additional problems loom large
in a multinational setting. One is the lack of transparency in tax information
that occurs in small-island tax havens, such as the Cayman Island, Bermuda,
and the British Virgin Islands (BVI). 124 The other problem is the hybrid
mismatch opportunity posed by European intermediary jurisdictions, such
as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.125 Traditionally, the three
types of jurisdictions, which offer tax information secrecy, hybrid mismatch
opportunities, and treaty shopping, are collectively called tax havens because
often a tax haven offers more than one opportunity at the same time.126
However, the lumped terminology of a tax haven does not help to analyze
each type of problem accurately, considering that the function of the three
opportunities is different from each other.
1. Paradigm Case 3.1: Country Where Pass-Through
Vehicle Is Located
Ironically, this case may be the least tax-motivated transaction. In the
single jurisdictional frame, Paradigm Case 1.1 is, in effect, tax-motivated
because it uses a vehicle not subject to entity-level taxation. However,

123. I also assume that the residence country of investors has a worldwide tax system
of international taxation, where its resident is subject to tax on all its active income earned
abroad or domestically.
124. See Johannesen & Zucman, supra note 24, at 66–68.
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., id.
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once a pass-through tax regime is given, the function of this vehicle in
multinational jurisdictions becomes mainly financial.127 In fact, the use
of a pass-through vehicle is desirable to pool investor capital from
multiple countries to fund a project in a third country.128 This tactic can
be beneficial for shareholder-level diversification and, in some cases, for
achieving threshold levels of capital to fund a project. Furthermore, it
may make sense to locate an intermediary capital-pooling entity in a third
country unrelated to the shareholders or the location of investment. This
is not about avoiding residence country taxation so much as avoiding extra
tax cost.129
Whatever the financial motive, the tax consequence of Paradigm Case
3.1 is nonetheless very different from that of Paradigm Cases 1.1 in a
single jurisdiction or 2.1 in bilateral jurisdictions. I will analyze Paradigm
Case 3.1 with two scenarios: one with a tax treaty between Countries A
and B and the other without one.

C

\

Country D

Country E

:
Investor 1

i
i

Investor 3

Target Company

Country A
Figure 9 Paradigm Case 3.1

127. See, e.g., MARPLES, supra note 15, at 3–4 & 3 n.8.
128. See Kim, supra note 8, at 443.
129. It is intended not to bring on “extra” tax cost relative to aggregate tax cost if each
investor just held investment in the source country directly without pooling capital.
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a. When There Is a Tax Treaty Between Two Countries
Let us assume that in Paradigm Case 3.1, an investor is a resident of
Country C, which happens to have a tax treaty with Country A. Country
A also has a tax treaty with Country B, where the pass-through vehicle is
located. Whether the pass-through entity is entitled to treaty benefits under
the tax treaty between Countries A and B depends on the traditional threeprong test: whether the pass-through entity is a person, a resident, and a
beneficial owner of the income it receives.130 In a multinational structure,
it is not certain, again, whether the pass-through entity is entitled to treaty
benefits, particularly under the residency requirement.131
Assuming that Country B provides a pass-through tax regime for the
pass-through vehicle, it is more likely that the pass-through entity is not
entitled to the treaty benefits. The problems arise at this point as to the
investors. Some source countries treat such a case as a non-treaty case
and apply their domestic tax laws, mostly at a much higher tax rate than
the usual domestic tax rate or treaty rate.132 Had the investor in Country
C invested in a target company in Country A directly, the investor would have
been entitled to treaty benefits under the tax treaty between Countries A
and C. However, when an investor invests in the target company through
a pass-through vehicle in Country B, the investor is put in a worse position
by not being entitled to any treaty benefits because of the bilateral structure
of the treaty arrangements. This result harms the goal of tax neutrality between
direct investment and indirect investment.
However, such a policy—treating this scenario as a non-treaty case—
has a logical flaw. If the source country denies treaty benefits to the passthrough entity because it is a fiscally transparent entity, it means that the
source country does not treat the pass-through entity as a taxpayer on the
income. In that case, the source country should have determined who the
real taxpayer is instead of just dropping this case from further tax analysis.

130. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
131. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
132. For example, even if treaty benefits will be available to reduce the withholding
tax on payments of U.S. source income made to foreign pass-through or hybrid entities, the
United States may deny such benefits and tax the income at a full 30% withholding tax unless
the recipients furnish sufficient documentation to prove that they are the beneficial owner.
See I.R.C. § 894(c) (2012); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1441-1, -5 (2017).
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b. When There Is No Tax Treaty Between Two Countries:
Small-Island Tax Havens and Tax Secrecy
In the second scenario of Paradigm Case 3.1, no tax treaty exists between
Countries A and B. Typically, Country B is a small-island tax haven, such
as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, BVI, et cetera. These countries have
few tax treaties with the rest of the world and have a pass-through tax regime,
exempting foreign-source income from taxation.133 Most importantly, these
countries provide strong forms of secrecy.134
If Country A treats the pass-through entity as a fiscally transparent
entity, the problems are basically similar to those where the pass-through
entity is not entitled to treaty benefits in the first scenario. Some source
countries treat such a case as a non-treaty situation and just apply their
domestic laws, mostly at a much higher tax rate than the usual domestic
tax rate or treaty rate. However, the same logical flaw exists here,135 and,
again, the goal of tax neutrality between direct taxation and indirect taxation
cannot be achieved.
What is worse in the second scenario is that Country A, and even Country
C, is not likely be able to figure out who the real taxpayer is due to the
nontransparency of Country B. These countries provide strict bank secrecy
laws, making it nearly impossible for foreign countries to identify investors

133. For example, the Cayman Islands does not have a tax treaty with any country,
nor does it levy corporate income tax or any type of direct taxation on income earned offshore.
See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX
PURPOSES: CAYMAN ISLANDS 2017 (SECOND ROUND) 24 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.
org/taxation/global-forum-on-transparency-and-exchange-of-information-for-tax-purposescayman-islands-2017-second-round_9789264280168-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/E7X5YRMS]; TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, FINANCIAL SECRECY INDEX 2018: NARRATIVE REPORT ON
CAYMAN ISLANDS 13 (2018), https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/CaymanIslands.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39TB-GLSV].
134. See, e.g., William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1,
24, 48 (2019). To understand how the Cayman Islands’ local laws are designed to protect
banking privacy, see OECD, supra note 133; TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 133. The
Tax Justice Network releases the Financial Secrecy Index of various countries and full
data on each country in the list, available at http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com [https://
perma.cc/4MBP-NWNE].
135. If the source country treats the pass-through entity as a fiscally transparent entity,
it means that it does not treat the pass-through entity as a taxpayer on the income, so it
should determine who the real taxpayer is first. If the real taxpayer is a resident of Country
A, it would be a round-tripping case, where the income is derived through an offshore nonCIV that is not a resident of the source country but such income is attributed to a resident
of the source country. If, however, the real taxpayer is a resident of Country C, which happens
to have a tax treaty with Country A, it is not clear whether the treaty between Countries A
and C would be applicable. If it is not applicable, investors in Country C would be put in a
worse position than the one they would be in had they invested in a target company in
Country A directly.
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in the vehicles domiciled in their jurisdiction.136 Had Country B entered
into tax treaties with Country A or C containing a tax information exchange
provision, Country A or C might invoke that provision to seek tax information
relating to the vehicle. However, at present, Country B has not entered into
such tax treaties with the rest of the world.
To overcome the lack of a treaty network with jurisdictions like Country
B, the OECD Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange of
Information released the Model Tax Information Exchange Agreements
(TIEAs) in 2002.137 These model agreements allow international cooperation
for exchanging tax information between competent authorities.138 There
are currently more than 500 TIEAs, and the United States has entered into
TIEAs with most of the small-island tax havens.139 However, the scope of
information exchange is mostly limited to specific requests relating to an
already-initiated tax investigation. As such, the TIEAs are still not effective
tools for exchanging broader information, such as a financial accounting
or identity of investors in the vehicles domiciled in Country B.
2. Paradigm Case 3.2: Country Where Holding Company Is Located
a. Treaty Shopping
When an SPC or holding company is interposed in a jurisdiction—Country
B—different from the jurisdictions of investors and the target company,
Country B almost always has an extensive treaty network. It also almost
always provides a holding company with a tax regime to maximize treaty
benefits. Therefore, Paradigm Case 3.2 exists as a more tax-oriented structure
in a multinational setting. Country B is often called a “conduit jurisdiction.”140
The distinction between a real tax avoidance case and a business conduit
case becomes blurred here.

136. See Moon, supra note 134, at 43.
137. OECD, TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS (TIEAS), http://www.oecd.org/
ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm [https://perma.cc/
GQ44-ZQH8].
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Javier Garcia-Bernardo et al., Companies Use These Countries to Reach
Tax Havens, U.S. NEWS (Jul. 25, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/bestcountries/articles/2017-07-25/these-countries-are-conduits-for-the-worlds-largest-tax-havens
[https://perma.cc/JMQ6-9YB5].
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It would be fair to assume in Paradigm Case 3.2 that there is a tax treaty
between Countries A and B. Typical examples of Country B are Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Mauritius, all of which offer
more favorable tax treaty benefits than the direct investment model.141
Treaty shopping is a form of terminology used to describe the behavior of
investors that select those countries with favorable tax treaty benefits.142
C
Investor 1

::.,

Co untry D

fi

Country E

! Investor 2 i Investor 3
\;
:f
...L....... _. ·-----··· :...... ..................... _

SPC (Holding
Company)

Target Company

Country B

Country A

Figure 10 Paradigm Case 3.2

Whether the holding company is entitled to treaty benefits depends on
the three requirements under the traditional rule: that is, again, whether it
is a person, resident, and beneficial owner of the income it receives. In
contrast to the pass-through entity in the Paradigm Case 3.1, the SPC is
a corporation subject to comprehensive taxation in Country B. As a result,
it is more likely to meet the first two requirements: status as a legal person,
and as a resident of Country B.143 However, as the SPC is a conduit, it is not
certain whether it is entitled to treaty benefits, particularly given the beneficial
ownership requirement.
Until the late 1980s, countries were generous in admitting such holding
companies as beneficial owners of income received from the source

141. Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by
Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 619,
648 (2009); Tax Treaties, TAX JUST. NETWORK, https://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporatetax/tax-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/J969-24XK].
142. Grady, supra note 72, at 627.
143. See OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
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country.144 However, most countries, especially source countries whose
treaties with the conduit jurisdiction are at issue, became reluctant to recognize
such holding companies as beneficial owners of the income.145 Furthermore,
the OECD report on the use of conduit companies146 and the Commentaries
on the Articles of the OECD Model implied that granting treaty benefits
to a holding company that is merely a conduit may be inconsistent with
the object and purpose of the tax treaty.147
b. Hybrid Mismatch that Eliminates a Holding Company’s Tax Liability
Treaty shopping is widespread in international tax practice. It is relatively
easy for governments and tax professionals to understand. However, the
holding company regime in intermediate jurisdictions has been mysterious,
except to a handful of experts. It is quite rare to see materials that explain
such regimes. This lack of understanding has been a major obstacle in analyzing
the overall tax consequences of non-CIV transactions. Therefore, it would
be useful to introduce how the actual holding company regime works in
the real world.
One of the most popular holding company regimes is the société de
participation financière (SOPARFI) of Luxembourg.148 This regime offers
a “participation exemption” that eliminates domestic entity-level tax on
dividends and capital gains received from its subsidiary if the SOPARFI

144. See OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies,
in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, supra note 25, at R(6)-1,
R(6)-2 [hereinafter OECD, CONDUIT REPORT]. The OECD Conduit Report was originally
adopted by the OECD Council in 1986 to deny treaty benefits for an entity “with the main or
sole purpose of obtaining treaty benefits which would not be available directly to such [entity].”
Id. Countries were especially willing to make this designation when the holding company
had discretionary power to manage the investment independent from the investors.
145. See id. at R(6)-2 (explaining that the tax advantages that a conduit company
enjoys is detriment to the source country).
146. See generally OECD, CONDUIT REPORT, supra note 144.
147. OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 12, at C(10)-3.
148. Julien Bieber, Gaëlle Auger & Linda Taing, Private Equity Structuring in
Luxembourg—Key Tax Aspects, in 38 TAX PLAN. INT’L REV. 11, 12–13 (2011). For the
holding company regime in Luxembourg, thanks to Johan Léonard (N.Y.U. School of Law,
LL.M. in International Taxation 2014). This Part could not have been completed without his
helpful comments and explanation. Interview with Johan Léonard, Partner, NautaDutilh,
in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Feb. 21, 2014).
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holds 10% or more ownership in the subsidiary.149 It also provides flexible,
thin capitalization rules150 and hybrid instruments.151
Assuming Country A in Figure 10 is Belgium and Country B is Luxembourg,
the dividend distributed by the target company is also subject to a 0%
withholding tax rate under the Belgium-Luxembourg tax treaty.152 As such,
the tax on the SOPARFI’s income is not triggered in the source country.
Furthermore, tax obligations cannot be triggered on the income repatriated
by the SOPARFI to its foreign investors, such as in the United States.
SOPARFIs have to comply with a flexible thin capitalization rule, which
requires a debt/equity ratio of 15% equity to 85% debt,153 or alternatively
1% equity, 14% interest-free loan usually in the form of Convertible Preferred
Equity Certificates (CPEC), and 85% interest-bearing loan, which is usually
in the form of Preferred Equity Certificates (PEC).154 If the debt ratio exceeds
the above-mentioned ratio, interest on that excess debt will be treated as
dividend subject to Luxembourg’s 15% withholding tax.155 However, as
long as the specified debt/equity ratio is met, all repatriation of returns on
investment to the investors is not subject to Luxembourg withholding tax
under domestic tax law, regardless of the treaty benefits between Luxembourg
and the residence countries of investors.156
Going back to the 85:15 debt/equity ratio, or the alternative 1% equity/
14% CPEC/85% PEC capital structure, both CPECs and PECs are hybrid
instruments. From the U.S. perspective, PEC and CPEC are both equity,
149. Bieber, Auger & Taing, supra note 148, at 12. Participation exemption does not
exempt tax on interest income from a loan extended to the subsidiary. However, that interest
received can be effectively offset by interest payments out of interest-bearing loans to the
shareholders, as long as the SOPARFI retains a small amount of taxable margin at 8 ~ 20
basis points (bps), or 0.08 ~ 0.2%, and only such small margin will be subject to the normal
Luxembourg corporate tax rate—29.22%. Interview with Johan Léonard, supra note 148.
150. When a company is financed through a mixture of debt and equity, it often prefers
debt to equity because interest payments are deductible whereas dividends are not. Thin
capitalization rules aim to administer an adequate level of debt/equity ratio and deny deduction
of certain interest payment of a company, if a company is financed through a relatively high
level of debt compared to equity. See Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in
International Taxation, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 311, 344 (2015).
151. Bieber, Auger & Taing, supra note 148, at 12–13. See generally Omri Marian,
The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2017).
152. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Regulation of Certain
Other Matters with Respect to Taxes on Income and Fortune, Belg.-Lux., art. 10, § 1, Sept.
17, 1970, 870 U.N.T.S. 12503.
153. Marian, supra note 151, at 28.
154. See OGIER, LUXEMBOURG: STRUCTURING AND FINANCING PRIVATE EQUITY AND
VENTURE CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS (2017), https://www.ogier.com/media/brochures/ogierstructuring-and-financing-private-equity-and-venture-capital-transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8KZC-N5AH].
155. Marian, supra note 151, at 28.
156. See id.
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not debt, while from the Luxembourg perspective, both PEC and CPEC are
debt, the return of which is interest and deductible, although there would
be no return for CPEC because it is an interest-free loan.157 One caveat is
that CPEC is considered as equity only for the purpose of the 85:15 debt/
equity ratio in Luxembourg.158
The last puzzle of the capital structure is the 1% equity, the dividend
payment on which is in principle subject to 15% Luxembourg withholding
tax, unless there is a more favorable tax treaty between Luxembourg and
the residence country of investors who receive dividend. However, such
tax again can be eliminated by using “alphabet classes of shares.”159
In sum, in Figure 10, there is no remaining tax liability in the whole picture,
except corporate tax of the target company to the source country Belgium,
income tax of the investors in their own residence country the United States,
and the Luxembourg corporate income tax of the holding company with respect
to the interest income, which is not exempt under the participation regime.
However, this final amount paid to Luxembourg is nominal.160 By providing
hybrid mismatch in back-to-back structure, the holding company is, in effect,
not liable to pay tax on the income it receives.161 It pays a nominal amount
157. The benefits of the hybrid nature of PEC and CPEC are not limited to Luxembourg
taxation. Because the residence countries of investors, such as the United States, usually
provide more favorable tax treatment to dividend income than interest income, it is more
beneficial for investors’ tax position as well. See Bieber, Auger & Taing, supra note 148,
at 13. The equity treatment of the hybrid instrument would be considered as benefits from
the investors’ standpoint in the multinational fund investment structure. However, considering
that such investors would have held plain equity in a direct investment situation, investors
are motivated to hold such hybrid instrument to neutralize their tax position in the residence
country in indirect investment.
158. OGIER, supra note 154.
159. To be specific, if, for example, a SOPARFI is supposed to receive income annually
from its subsidiary for ten years and it should repatriate corresponding income to its foreign
investors, it issues ten classes of alphabet stock, Class A through Class J, and liquidates a
whole stock of one class annually in turn, instead of paying dividend to investors, until the
stocks are exhausted. Because such partial liquidation is not subject to Luxembourg withholding
tax, and because the life span of PEFs is around a decade, this strategy will effectively
eliminate the withholding tax on the dividend income.
160. Assuming that investors invest $100 in the holding company, $85 of which would
be in the form of PEC. If the holding company extends a back-to-back loan by using such
PEC to the target company at the interest rate of 10%, it should retain at least 8 bps margins, so
the interest rate of PEC would be 9.92%. Hence, only $0.068 (0.08% of $85) is annually
subject to Luxembourg income tax, not to mention the various mechanisms to eliminate tax on
the inbound and outbound cash flow. $0.068 is very small figure even if we conservatively
assume the rate of return at the level of the holding company as $10 (10% of $100).
161. See, e.g., Marian, supra note 151, at 38.
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on the small spread under the name of “income tax” to Luxembourg, but
in substance, this amount is more like a “fee” for the service and system
that Luxembourg provides, not an income tax.162 Omri Marian recently
demonstrated that this small spread depends on the “face amount” passing
through Luxembourg from source country to residence country, not on the
income.163 To attract more investors and money flow through Luxembourg,
the fee is even discounted if the gross amount flowing through Luxembourg
increases.164
c. When the Treaty Benefits Are Denied
In the above example, the holding company is, in effect, not liable to pay
tax on the income it receives. The only exception is a small taxable amount
in proportion to the face amount flowing through the country where it is
located.165 Because this nominal tax is, in substance, a fee rather than income
tax, it is fair for some source countries to argue that such a holding company
would not be entitled to the treaty benefits under the treaty between Countries
A and B because it is not the beneficial owner of the income.
The problems arise at this point, just as in Paradigm Case 3.1. There is
no coherent rule or practice in the current international tax regime when
the tax treaty between Countries A and B is not applicable. Some source
countries treat this situation as a non-treaty case and apply their domestic
laws.166 They mostly do so at a much higher tax rate than the usual domestic
tax rate or treaty rate.167 However, once the tax authorities of the source
countries deny the treaty benefits, they do not care about the further tax
consequences.168 Issues exist with respect to whether the source country
should find a true beneficial owner of the income, recast the transaction
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 29.
See id. at 38.
See id. at 37–38.
TABLE 3 – MARGINS CHARGED BY LUXEMBOURG
Face Amount Financed through
Taxable Margin
Luxembourg (in EUR millions)
< 25
0.25%
25 to 187.5
0.125%
187.5 to 500
0.09357%
500 to 1,250
0.0625%
1,250 to 6,250
0.03125%
> 6,250
0.015625%

Id. at 38.
165. GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 311.
166. See Birmingham & Bandoblu, supra note 43, at 18.
167. See, e.g., id. at 19.
168. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 1419–20
& 1420 n.205 (2016).
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accordingly, and think about the tax consequences according to the recast
transaction.
The OECD Commentary suggests as a solution that if the holding company
is denied the status of beneficial owner, the beneficiary who is a resident
of a third country, Country C, will be able to enjoy the treaty benefits under
the tax treaty between the source country, Country A, and the third country,
Country C, if there is such a treaty.169 Although the OECD Commentary
does not mandate the provision of treaty benefits between the payer and
the beneficial owner, this position may serve the goal of tax neutrality between
direct investment and indirect investment.
It is fair to ask, however, whether it is legitimate to pursue tax neutrality
by applying a treaty between Countries A and C here. Clearly, Paradigm
Case 3.2 is more likely to be related to tax avoidance by claiming more
favorable benefits under the treaty between Countries A and B. Some might
argue that such a tax-avoiding transaction deserves a tax position that merely
denies treaty benefits with no further analysis. This position would, in effect,
operate as a penalty on investors.
Nevertheless, such an argument is incomplete and perhaps a bit
irresponsible. In the case of domestic tax law, if transactions are challenged by
tax authorities and recast into a legitimate transaction, subsequent tax
adjustment, taking into account the identity of the beneficial owner of the
income derived from the transaction, is followed.170 The final tax liability
would be heavier than the original transaction in most cases, although that
is not always the case.171 But once it is determined that there is a tax avoidance,
tax consequences are determined based on such a recast transaction in a
logical and coherent way.172 The lack of such subsequently adjusting rules
ex ante in international tax is a huge defect as a complete system.

169. See OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 12.2, at C(10)4; para. 11, at C(11)-8; para. 4.2, at C(12)-2.
170. Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30
VA. TAX REV. 465, 475 (2011).
171. Sometimes the recast transaction results in similar or even lesser tax liability than
the original transaction does. However, the change of tax liability in a less severe way is
a factor to determine whether there is tax avoidance in the first place. Id. at 475–76.
172. See id. at 475–76, 483. As a matter of fact, the domestic tax codes have penalty
provisions, so the risk of less severe tax liability could be mitigated by the imposition of
tax penalty provisions. Scott D. Michel, Zhanna A. Ziering & Young Ran Kim, U.S. Offshore
Account Enforcement Issues, 16 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 49, 50 (2014).
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3. Paradigm Case 3.3: Combined Structure
The third paradigm case in a multinational setting is the combination of
Paradigm Cases 3.1 and 3.2. This scenario may be the most realistic nonCIV structure as is shown in Figure 2. The problems are also compounded
in this case.
D
Investor 1

i

';

''

Country F

Country E
Investor 2

Investor 3

Country C

SPC (Ho lding Company)
Country B

Target Company

Country A

Figure 11. Paradigm Case 3.3

First, the holding company is typically a conduit located in the intermediate
jurisdiction.173 The holding company is not likely to pay the entity-level
taxation in effect to Country B. This lack of payment eliminates tax
consequences on inbound and outbound cash flow, and it converts the character
of income to get a more favorable tax treatment in the investor countries.174
Furthermore, there is almost always a very favorable tax treaty between
Countries A and B. The treaty benefits under the treaty between Countries
A and B are, in most cases, more favorable than the treaty benefits under the
treaty between Countries A and D. Moreover, there are often multiple layers
of holding companies in multiple jurisdictions.175 Those holding companies

173.
174.
175.

See OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, at C(23)-4.
See supra Section III.C.2.
See supra Figure 2.
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are designed not to trigger taxes, and some are used to advance third-party
loans other than shareholder loans.176
Second, the pass-through vehicle is designed for pooling capital from
investors in various countries. Sometimes the pass-through vehicle is established
in the same country as some or all investors. Sometimes, however, the passthrough vehicle is established in a different country from that of investors.
In the latter case, it is most likely to be a small-island tax haven that provides
a pass-through tax regime, a hybrid entity, exemption from tax on foreign
source income, and confidentiality.177 However, Country C is not likely to
have a tax treaty with any of the remaining jurisdictions in Figure 11, which
breaks the chain of bilateral tax treaties.
In Figure 11, the only production of services and goods happens in the
target company in Country A, the source country. The capital for the investment
in the target company mostly comes from Countries D, E, and F, except
for certain third-party loans. It flows through to Country A. The return
arising out of the target company also flows through the vehicles until it
reaches investors in Countries D, E, and F. Hence, the whole structure of
this non-CIV may, in essence, be accomplishing what would have been
accomplished by an indirect investment in a single or bilateral setting—that
is, the structure does not trigger any substantial taxes in the middle of the
cash flow.
After all, investors often achieve more favorable tax consequences than
the tax-neutral benchmark if the tax planning explained above is successfully
respected by all relevant countries.178 However, many tax authorities, especially
in source countries, have been challenging such preferential tax consequences
of investors by attacking the residency of holding companies or pass-through
vehicles.179 Once they challenge the treaty benefits, tax authorities usually
recast the transaction as a non-treaty case, where investors would receive
much worse tax consequences than the tax-neutral benchmark. Appendix
A briefly shows such results in hypothetical problems.180
Furthermore, even if the treaty benefits are not challenged by tax authorities,
another problem harms tax-neutral consequences for investors. That is,
investors may not use foreign tax credits for the withholding tax paid to
176. See, e.g., Wells & Lowell, supra note 23, at 543–44.
177. See generally Benshalom, supra note 141, at 647–48.
178. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 72, at 627–28.
179. See LANG, supra note 114, at 40–41 (explaining the tension that typically arises
between a source and residence country).
180. See infra Part VII.
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source countries because they are not technically taxpayers liable to such
withholding tax.181 For example, the tax on the dividend income withheld
by Country A, the source country, cannot be credited in Country B or C as
a foreign tax credit (FTC).182 This tax on the dividend income cannot be
credited because the pass-through entity or holding company is not liable
for any taxes to Country B.183 The investors in Countries D, E, or F are not
likely to claim FTC, either, because from the residence country’s perspective,
the eligible foreign tax for FTC would be the one paid to Country C, or Country
B at best, not the one to Country A.184 This FTC problem also harms tax
neutrality in multinational fund investments.
In sum, international tax law does not see the whole structure due to the
restriction imposed by the bilateral structure of tax treaties. The source
country focuses on the tax analysis with its most adjacent jurisdiction and
determines whether the tax treaty between them would be applicable. It
does not further analyze matters beyond that point, such as who will be
the real taxpayers of the income and what the tax rules should be for them.
The residence country focuses on tax rules for repatriating the offshore
money.185 However, there is no overarching approach linking the whole
level of taxation under a comprehensive ex ante rule.

181. GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 309.
182. Id. at 310.
183. See, e.g., id.
184. There are examples of these FTC problems in South Korea. Korean investors
in a Korean mutual fund invested in Brazil through a wholly-owned U.S. LLC. National
Tax Service [NTS], International Tax Resource Management Office-335 (July 16, 2010)
(S. Kor.). The U.S. LLC established a wholly-owned corporate subsidiary in Brazil to
invest in the real estate in Brazil. Id. The Brazilian subsidiary paid dividend to the U.S. LLC
after withholding 15% tax. Id. Since the U.S. LLC checked the box to elect to be disregarded
for U.S. tax purposes, it cannot claim direct FTC against such withholding tax, which
should be available to the Korean investors instead. Id. However, Korean tax authorities
held that Korean investors may not claim FTC against such withholding tax paid to the
Brazilian government, thereby creating a double taxation problem where neither the U.S.
LLC nor the Korean investors in U.S. LLC could claim FTCs. Id. In contrast, if Country
C is the United States, the investor in Country C is likely to claim FTC. GUSTAFSON, PERONI
& PUGH ET AL., supra note 18, at 309–10.
185. For example, controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules and passive foreign
investment company (PFIC) rules are anti-deferral regimes, aiming to eliminate the economic
benefit of deferring U.S. taxes on the foreign-source income until they are repatriated to
the United States. I.R.C. §§ 951–65, 1291–98 (2012). For general introduction and overview
of the CFC and PFIC, see GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH , supra note 18, at 485–93. The
Proposal discussed in Section IV.D also intends to tax foreign-source income on a current
basis by relying on the pass-through tax system, so both the Proposal and the anti-deferral
regimes share the same position in terms of timing perspective. However, as the CFC and
PFIC is a top down approach, it has limitations on figuring out the overall structure of the
cross-border investment all the way down to the source country if blockers are interposed
in the middle of the structure.
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Therefore, the investors in non-CIVs structure the transactions too
aggressively to exploit the limit of bilateral solutions and sometimes achieve
substantially lower tax liability than the tax-neutral benchmark. However,
when the source countries challenge the transactions ex post, the tax burdens
increase exponentially because the source countries do not consider multinational
dimensions of their tax policy.186 Either case is not desirable.
Under the current bilateral approach, each country, where any vehicle is
located, should count and be eligible to exercise tax jurisdiction in principle,
even though some intermediary jurisdictions are not exercising it but are
merely severing as a blocker of the cash-flow and tax information for
international tax purposes. However, the vehicles in such jurisdictions would
have been just disregarded or ignored for tax purposes under the passthrough tax regime in domestic tax law. Does every country have enough
reason to claim to exercise tax jurisdiction on the investment by non-CIVs
just because it is an international transaction? If not, it is time to revisit the
existing rules and suggest a new approach fit for a multinational setting.
IV. ENGINEERING PASS-THROUGH RULES FOR MULTINATIONAL FUNDS
The previous Part examined the inadequate rules and practices of international
taxation for multinational fund investments. To overcome the limited
bilateral approach, major trading countries and international organizations
have studied and introduced multilateral approaches. This Part reviews
those efforts and introduces the Proposal for non-CIVs.
A. OECD Partnership Report
The OECD’s first effort to address the problem concerning multinational
fund investments took place in the 1990s.187 This approach was directed
toward the different treatment of partnerships in an international context
and the resulting double taxation or double non-taxation.188
Many countries treat partnership as fiscally transparent for tax purposes.
However, some countries, such as Belgium and France, treat them as entities

186. See infra Part VII.
187. See generally OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25.
188. See generally F.A. Engelen & F.P.G. Pötgens, Report on “The Application of
the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships” and the Interpretation of Tax Treaties,
40 EUR. TAX’N 250 (2000).
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with legal personality and subject them to corporate income tax.189 The
OECD Partnership Report in 1999 focused on such “conflicts of qualification”
of, and “conflict of income allocation” to, a partnership.190 These conflicts
represent instances where the source country and residence country interpret
or apply a treaty to that partnership in different ways.191 If an entity is not
widely used in the civil or commercial laws of treaty partners, one country
could treat the entity as a partnership while the other treats it as a company.192
This outcome would lead, of course, to different tax results between treaty
partners.193 Focused on these types of issues, the Partnership Report
emphasized a better coordination in the application and interpretation of
some of the provisions of tax treaties.194
The Partnership Report first suggests that if a partnership is liable to
tax in a country, it qualifies as a resident.195 The partnership is thus entitled
to treaty benefits. It then suggests entitling individual partners, but not the
partnership, to the treaty benefits of the countries where partners are residents
to the extent they are liable to taxation on their share of the partnership
income in countries where the partnership does not qualify as a resident.196
When discussing the conflicts of qualifications in greater detail, the
Partnership Report suggests that a useful starting point for determining
whether a partnership qualifies as a resident for treaty purposes is the
principle in the domestic law that governs matters regarding how an item
of income is taxed.197
Unfortunately, the Partnership Report failed to obtain full support from
the OECD member countries. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Switzerland expressed reservations over the proposed changes to the
OECD Model Tax Convention.198 France noted that the proposed criteria
of being liable to tax are not sufficient in addressing situations where the
entity is hybrid in nature—the entity is partly treated as a taxable unit and
partly disregarded for tax purposes.199 It further disagrees with the conclusion
that if treaty benefits to the partnership are refused, the partners would always
be entitled to the treaty benefits by their own country of residence.200 Lastly,
189. See Jean Schaffner, The OECD Report on the Application of Tax Treaties
to Partnerships, 54 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 218, 218 (2000).
190. OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-3 to -4.
191. See id.
192. Id. at R(15)-6.
193. Id.
194. See id. at R(15)-7.
195. Id. at R(15)-14.
196. Id.
197. Id. at R(15)-31; see LANG, supra note 114, at 31.
198. OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-57 to -62.
199. Id. at R(15)-57.
200. Id.
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France asserted the “administrative difficulties” for implementing the proposed
changes.201 Such problems included the flow of information for partnerships,
given that many partners may reside in different nations.202 Germany shared
similar concerns regarding administrative difficulties, noting that “[i]t is
an extremely difficult task . . . to attribute the income subject to withholding
tax to the partners, because the withholding agent does not know the often
very complicated and sometimes even abusive arrangement between the
partners on the division of profits (and losses).”203
Despite the criticism and reservations, the OECD Committee on Fiscal
Affairs adopted the Partnership Report in 1999.204 The proposed changes
were reflected in the OECD Model Tax Convention in 2000.205
B. OECD CIV Report
A decade after it released the Partnership Report, the OECD resumed
the discussion on the cross-border investment using pass-through vehicles.
This time, the discussion was focused on CIVs, such as mutual funds, and
excluded non-CIV funds from its scope.206 The OECD Model Commentary,
followed by the adoption of the CIV Report, suggested roughly four possible
provisions modifying the treatment of CIVs.207 Two of them could be
acknowledged as multilateral approaches.208 Although these suggestions
are limited to CIVs, they provide important insights for thinking about a
new multilateral approach for non-CIVs.
The first suggestion is the purely proportional approach. It suggests that
in the case where a CIV established in Country B receives income arising in
Country A, the CIV shall be treated as a resident of Country B.209 The CIV
also may be considered the beneficial owner of the income it receives, but
only to the extent that the beneficial interests in the CIV are owned by
equivalent beneficiaries.210 The equivalent beneficiaries include (1) a

201. Id. at R(15)-58 to -59.
202. See id.
203. Id. at R(15)-59.
204. Id. at R(15)-1.
205. OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 23A, para 4, at M-52.
206. See OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24).
207. OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, paras. 6.21 to .34, at
C(1)-10 to -17.
208. See id.
209. See id. para. 6.21, at C(1)-10 to -11.
210. Id.
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resident of Country B and (2) a resident of any other State, Country C, with
which Country A has a tax treaty, who would be entitled under that treaty,
or under the domestic law of Country A, to a rate of tax with respect to the
particular item of income that is at least as low as the rate claimed under
the tax treaty between Country A and Country B by the CIV with respect to
that income had the investor received that income.211
The effect of this first approach is to achieve the goals of tax neutrality
between direct investments and indirect investments through a CIV.212 At
the same time, it may prevent investors from abusing a CIV to achieve a
better treaty position than through direct investment, by way of the rate
comparison in the definition of the equivalent beneficiary.213
However, the CIV Report provides a second prong for the first suggestion,
limited by bilateral solutions. If some states prefer the bilateral nature of
tax treaties, they may not want to take all treaty-eligible investors, including
those in a third country, Country C, into account.214 In this case, the states
“may prefer to allow treaty benefits to a CIV only to the extent that the investors
in the CIV are residents of the Contracting State in which the CIV is
established,” Country B.215
The second suggestion is to provide an ownership threshold for the treaty
benefits. It provides that the purely proportional approach may “impose
substantial administrative burdens as a CIV attempts to determine the
treaty entitlement of every single investor.”216 Hence, this suggestion considers
the rationale that if a substantial portion of the CIV’s investors are treatyeligible, a contracting state may decide that such CIV is not engaged in
treaty shopping. Thus, if an amount is owned in the CIV above a certain
ownership threshold by either equivalent beneficiaries or a resident of the
country where the CIV is established, the treaty “benefits would be provided
with respect to all income received by the CIV.”217
The two suggestions have their own distinctive merits. The former
reinforces the principle of tax neutrality between direct investment and
indirect investment. The latter simplifies the procedures. However,
the purely proportional approach seems to be the most genuine multilateral
approach. Nonetheless, even that approach does not entirely overcome
bilateral solutions because in order for it to function in the multinational
domain, there should be tax treaties in every part of the entire structure.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. para. 6.21(b)(ii), at C(1)-10.
Id. para. 6.23, at C(1)-11.
Id. para. 6.24, at C(1)-11.
See id. para. 6.26, at C(1)-12 to -13.
Id.
Id. para. 6.27, at C(1)-13.
Id.
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This approach may not work if a country without a tax treaty, such as a
country favored to pose a pass-through entity, is interposed. In addition,
it is also a sign of bilateral solutions that the technically applicable tax treaty
is the one between the source country and the residence country of the
immediate recipient of the income or CIV, although the benefits actually
granted are from the treaty between the source country and the residence
country of the equivalent beneficiaries. A true multilateral approach should
be able to function in the multinational domain even if there is a missing
link in the treaty network and even if there is no such device as an equivalent
beneficiary clause.
C. OECD Non-CIV Discussion
In 2016, as part of its BEPS project, the OECD began discussing non-CIV
funds.218 The discussion, which continues today as of 2019, remains focused
on the treaty entitlement of non-CIV funds rather than their overall problems.
However, the suggestions in the Public Discussion Draft from March 2016
(Non-CIV Discussion Draft) show much progress toward a multinational
solution. This Article examines two suggestions that are relevant to a
multinational solution.219
First, the Non-CIV Discussion Draft suggests that if (1) a non-CIV fund
is treated as a transparent entity by the residence country of investors and
(2) the investor is taxed directly on its share of the income derived through
that non-CIV, treaty benefits with respect to that income will be generally
available.220 The benefits will be available at the level of investors under
218. See, e.g., OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28; OECD, BEPS
ACTION 6 DISCUSSION DRAFT ON NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28.
219. OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 10. The Non-CIV Discussion
Draft suggests five approaches relating to the limitation on benefits (LOB) provision as
follows: (1) suggestion that treaty benefits be granted to regulated or widely held non-CIV
funds; (2) suggestion relating to non-CIV funds set up as transparent entities; (3) suggestion
that certain non-CIV funds be granted treaty benefits where a large portion of the investors
would be entitled to the same or better benefits if they had received the income directly;
(4) suggestion that the LOB should not deny benefits to a non-CIV resident of a State with
which the non-CIV has a sufficiently substantial connection; and (5) suggestion of a “Global
Streamed Fund” regime. See generally OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28.
The first suggestion has very limited scope as it applies only to regulated alternative investment
funds, which is basically the same solution as the mutual funds. The third and fourth suggestions
are either similar to the existing solutions in the CIV Report or repeat the existing bilateral
solutions, which may not resolve the problems in a multinational setting. On the other hand,
the second and fifth suggestions may be considered as multinational solutions.
220. See id. at 5–7.
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the treaty between the source country and the residence country of the
investors.221 This transparent entity provision is expected to address not only
the treaty-shopping concerns but also the hybrid mismatch problem.222
Commentators suggest that a non-CIV should be able to elect to be treated
as fiscally transparent for treaty purpose. However, such an election would
be a matter of domestic law that requires a non-CIV to attribute its income
to its investors.
An important strength of the transparent entity provision is that it confronts
the limitation of the existing bilateral approach of treaty entitlement and
proposes a multinational solution. However, the Non-CIV Discussion Draft
does not seem to recommend this approach strongly due to a key practical
difficulty: the approach requires the source country to be provided with
all the relevant information concerning the investors in the non-CIV.223
Many commentators argue that identifying the tax residence of the investors
may not be possible “despite the evolving anti-money laundering legislation
and tax reporting regimes.”224
The second noteworthy suggestion is a Global Streamed Fund (GSF)
regime.225 The key features of this approach are that investment income
derived by a qualifying fund, a GSF, is exempted from any tax, including
withholding tax, if the fund distributes 100% of its income on a regular
basis.226 Upon these distributions, the GSF should determine tax by the
treaty between the source country and the residence country of investors.227
The GSF should then pay the so-determined tax, including withholding tax
payable to the source country, to its own residence country—the intermediate
jurisdiction.228 The fund-residence country would then remit the so-collected
tax to the relevant countries, especially the source country.229
The GSF regime is also recommended to be elective, not mandatory.230
It may be implemented by amending tax treaties between participating
countries by requiring a GSF to apply the appropriate rate in relation to its
distribution of the income relevant to this regime.231 The Non-CIV Discussion
221. Id. at 5. However, in the case of round-tripping, where the income is derived
through a non-CIV that is not a resident of the source country and such income is attributed
to the investors who are residents of the source country, such benefits are not available.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 6.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 10.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 11. It is also intended for closed-end non-CIVs rather than other types of
funds. Id.
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Draft expects that the proposal also address not only the treaty shopping
concern but also the deferral concerns because a GSF would be required
to distribute 100% of its income.232
Since the Non-CIV Discussion Draft was released in 2016, the OECD
also has released another Discussion Draft on Non-CIV Examples.233 It
also has released comments received on the draft in February 2017.234 As
of September 2019, the final Non-CIV Report has yet to be published.
D. The Proposal for Non-CIV Funds
The bright side of these efforts is that the OECD is endeavoring to
accomplish tax neutrality in multinational fund investment. For example,
the GSF regime in the Non-CIV Discussion Draft suggests that as long as
a fund distributes 100% of its income to its investors on a regular basis,
its tax consequences would be eliminated.235 The draft also suggests that
the tax consequences for investors would be determined by considering
only the source country and residence country.236 However, the discussion
regarding both CIV and non-CIV funds is limited to only the treaty entitlement
issue. Tax treaties are an important source of international tax law. However,
when the fund investment is spread across multiple countries, it is highly
likely that at least some of the countries do not have treaty networks with
other countries involved in the investment structure. Focusing on the treaty
entitlement issue may resolve the treaty shopping issue, but that is only a partial
solution to the overall problem in multinational indirect investment.
More importantly, the GSF regime gives intermediary countries the primary
authority to determine the overall tax consequences.237 It also grants them
authority to collect taxes on behalf of the source and residence countries
and to remit the tax to them.238 This approach requests the source and residence
countries to comply with the so-determined result.239 However, considering

232. Id.
233. OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28.
234. OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT: BEPS ACTION
6—EXAMPLES ON TREATY ENTITLEMENT OF NON-CIV FUNDS (2017), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/
treaties/Non-CIV-Examples-Compilation-of-Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/KMQ8-L47Q].
235. OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 11; see supra notes 225–
32 and accompanying text.
236. OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 10.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id.
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that many aggressive tax planning techniques, such as treaty shopping, hybrid
mismatches, and secrecy are mostly offered by intermediary countries, it
is difficult to justify their primary taxing power in multinational fund
investment.
Therefore, this Article offers the following new alternative Proposal for
non-CIV funds. The Proposal is as follows: As long as a fund distributes
100% of its income to its investors and, as a result, eliminates any substantial
tax liability in the intermediary jurisdictions other than to the source country
and residence countries, such an investment scheme shall qualify for
international pass-through taxation.240 The investment fund would be able
to make the election to be treated in this manner. By doing so, the source
country and residence country shall together determine whether the fund
is qualified for such international pass-through taxation.241 The source
country and residence country shall also collect taxes as if the investment
was made directly from the residence country to the source country. Therefore,
multinational indirect investors may achieve tax-neutral consequences as
if they invested directly. Intermediate countries are required to cooperate
in the process.
The end result of the Proposal would be similar to that of the OECD’s
approach. However, the Proposal may serve as a more effective alternative,
as it grants primary tax authority to source countries and residence countries
that are entitled to such tax, rather than the intermediary countries interposed
between them, which have been contemplated as the origin of many existing
problems.

240. There is potential pushback on the 100% distribution requirement—such
a requirement may create another cliff effect for taxpayers and suggesting lowering the
threshold to, for example, 90% equivalent to the 90% distribution rule for domestic SPCs
or adopting a proportional pass-through rule in proportion to the distribution amount.
However, the OECD is concerned about lowering the threshold from 100% because investors
may defer recognition of income on which treaty benefits have been granted if a 100%
distribution is not required. Id. at 11. Considering there is not a good reason to retain the
funds in the intermediary, taxpayers can easily avoid such a cliff effect.
241. The process will be initiated only if the investment fund makes the election to be
treated as a pass-through entity. The election should be filed with tax authorities in both
the source country and the residence country. If the two countries come up with different
answers, a dispute resolution mechanism should be available. The mutual agreement procedure
(MAP) in Article 25 of the OECD Model has been developed vigorously these days as part of
the BEPS Project, and, thus, it would be a good resource for the Proposal, as well. See OECD,
MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, ACTION 14: 2015 FINAL REPORT,
OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT (2015), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.
org/taxation/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-finalreport_9789264241633-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/F456-47GA]. More details on how the
source country and residence country would cooperate would be the task of a future project.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION: THE CASE OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
The purpose of the Proposal toward the international tax system is to
ensure pass-through taxation in appropriate cases. In the previous Part,
this Article argued that, to date, the international tax regime has not provided
an established pass-through tax rule or partnership tax rule, mainly because
of the prevalence of bilateralism. However, the traditional practice of
bilateralism in the international taxation sphere is not the only obstacle to
implementing a pass-through tax regime. Even if the Proposal as a multilateral
approach is implemented, two further prerequisites will be required: (1)
the provision of information on investment by non-CIVs242 and (2) the
exchange of such information among relevant tax authorities. This Part
examines what information the non-CIVs should provide with relevant tax
authorities and how, and with whom, the tax authorities would then share
that information. It also shows that there is a unique implementation
opportunity of the Proposal in the case of PEFs.
A. Prerequisites for the Proposal
1. Provision of Information on Investment
The first prerequisite is to obtain information on the investment of a particular
non-CIV. The necessary information includes the overall structure of the
non-CIV in question and the identity of investors. Thus, the most important
concern is whether the relevant tax authorities may institutionally obtain
such information and whether the non-CIV and its investors would be
willing to cooperate with tax authorities to provide such information.
a. Regulatory Permission
First, it will be necessary to devise solutions to regulatory and contractual
difficulties faced by the relevant parties. Non-CIVs might still be unwilling
to provide such information to the extent that they are bound by confidentiality
obligations toward their investors.

242. This is a third-party information reporting, because the taxpayers in a non-CIV
investment are the investors, not the non-CIV itself; just like the taxpayers in a partnership
investment is the partners, not the partnership. For the importance of third-party information
reporting by business firms in tax administration, see generally Leandra Lederman & Joseph C.
Dugan, Information Matters in Tax Enforcement, 2020 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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One may find the confidentiality excuse is similar to the long-lasting
argument of Swiss banks against becoming more transparent, relying on
their Bank Secrecy Law.243 However, Swiss banks’ resistance against
transparency has relented in the face of the recent global changes toward
enhanced transparency on tax information.244 The new institutional regime
for international taxation toward transparency, such as Automatic Exchange
of Information (AEOI) and the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), discussed in Subsection A.2, made Switzerland abandon its Bank
Secrecy Law and cooperate to provide tax information of its bank customers
to the customers’ residence countries.245
Furthermore, the European Union (EU) has devised a directive, known
as DAC 6, that imposes mandatory disclosure requirements for an intermediary
entity and its advisers to report cross-border arrangements with tax-avoidance
hallmarks, discussed in Section III.C, as from June 25, 2018.246
This Article argues that this new global regime will contribute to conditions
under which the non-CIV industry is more likely to overcome regulatory
and contractual hurdles and become more transparent. Before the emergence
of the new regime, it was a legitimate question to ask whether the non-CIV
industry was ready and willing to voluntarily become more transparent.
However, the new regime, particularly the FATCA, applies to the extended
category of financial institutions, which include not only traditional banking
industry, but also alternative investment entities, such as PEFs and hedge
funds.247 Therefore, the transparency for non-CIVs is expected to become
mandated soon, and it is hoped that the contribution of this Article to the
new regime will be several improvements applicable to non-CIVs.
b. Provision to Source Country
A caveat of the new regime is that it requires financial institutions, including
non-CIVs, to provide tax information regarding structure and investor
identity. Institutions must provide this information to either the jurisdiction
where the financial institution is located or the jurisdiction where the
taxpayers maintain residency.
All the while, the Proposal requires non-CIVs to provide information to
the source country jurisdictions. Thus, in addition to the current reporting
requirement to the residence country imposed by FATCA and FATCA-like
243. Stuart Gibson, Swiss Bank Secrecy—Their Lips Say Yes, but Their Eyes Say No,
FORBES (Apr. 5, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2017/04/05/switzerlandtheir-lips-say-yes-but-their-eyes-say-no/#35732b3f5783 [https://perma.cc/B7JZ-RDL6].
244. See id.
245. See infra Section V.A.2.
246. Council Directive 2018/822, 2018 O.J. (L 139/1) 1.
247. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(4)(i)(C) (2018).

762

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470429

POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 707, 2019]

10/15/2019 10:18 AM

Engineering Pass-Throughs in International Tax
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

laws, the Proposal needs additional domestic legislation that requires nonCIVs to report relevant tax information to source countries as well.
2. Exchange of Information
For an accurate tax analysis, relevant tax information should also be
shared among all relevant tax authorities in a timely manner. Thus, the
second prerequisite of the Proposal is the exchange of information (EOI)
collected among relevant tax authorities for accurate and consistent tax
administration throughout.
Fighting offshore tax evasion has become a top priority of international
tax policy in recent decades. After going through the LGT Bank affair248
and the UBS scandal,249 the EU and the United States, the two most important
voices in international tax law, realized they were vulnerable to offshore tax
evasion and were losing enormous tax revenues as a result. They also realized
that they had not fully caught up with the techniques used by their domestic
citizens of using offshore vehicles to “round-trip” or “circulate” funds. In
addition, the global financial crisis in 2007, which was caused by the reckless
practices of certain financial institutions, offered an opportunity to implement
a more active regulatory policy. It also triggered a global discussion regarding
overall transparency in the financial industry, from which a new regime
for international taxation is emerging.
A couple of important developments are worth noting, including the Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes

248. In 2008, Heinrich Kieber, a former employee of LGT Truehand, a trust company
affiliated with LGT Bank in Liechtenstein, stole customer data and provided it to tax authorities
throughout the EU and to the IRS under a newly enacted whistleblower provision. See Lynnley
Browning, Banking Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at C8.
249. In 2007, Bradley Birkenfeld exposed the tax avoidance strategies of UBS, where
UBS advised the U.S. taxpayers to establish foreign shell entities, which then opened offshore
accounts at the UBS based on the position that such offshore accounts need not be withheld
at the rate for the U.S. taxpayers nor be disclosed to the IRS. Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason,
United States National Report on Exchange of Information 2–3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-22, 2014); see Treas. Reg. §1.1441-1; Itai Grinberg,
The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 325–26 (2012).
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(Global Forum)’s initiative for AEOI,250 the U.S. FATCA,251 the OECD’s
BEPS project,252 and the EU’s various implementation measures.253
a. EOI System
The exchange of tax information is not a new system. To enforce domestic
tax law fully and fairly, access to tax information from other countries is
critical.254 Therefore, bilateral tax treaties have included EOI clauses
since World War II.255 Among various forms of EOI—including “upon
request,” “spontaneous,” and “automatic” EOI (AEOI)—the default rule for
EOI has been EOI upon request.256
However, EOI upon request has not been sufficient to fight against offshore
tax evasion.257 It has not provided information on non-compliant cases in
a timely manner due to the bureaucratic procedures for request.258 Furthermore,
it has not been sufficient for tax authorities to detect noncompliant cases
in the absence of previous indications of noncompliance.259
To overcome the limitations of the EOI upon request, AEOI is considered
as an alternative. After several attempts,260 AEOI finally obtained momentum
in the late 2000s, under the auspices of the Global Forum, when tax
transparency became the priority of the international tax policy.261 Since
2009, the Global Forum has pressured its member states to adopt broader

250. See generally Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for
Tax Purposes, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ [https://perma.cc/64SK-YV59].
251. See generally Summary of FATCA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, IRS (Jan. 29,
2019), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/summary-of-fatca-reporting-for-us-taxpayers
[https://perma.cc/4H4Q-RYE3].
252. See generally International Collaboration to End Tax Avoidance, OECD, http://
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ [https://perma.cc/D7NH-Q5CW].
253. See, e.g., Dario Paternoster, General Tax Policy, EUR. PARLIAMENT (May 2019),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/92/general-tax-policy [https://perma.cc/
5434-V7CD].
254. Grinberg, supra note 249, at 313.
255. Id. at 313–14.
256. OECD, Commentaries Tax Convention, supra note 49, para. 9.1, at C(26)-5; see
Grinberg, supra note 249, at 314–15. To be specific, Article 26 of the OECD Model requires
EOI upon request, permits automatic EOI, and forbids fishing expedition. See generally
OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 26, at M-62.
257. See Grinberg, supra note 249, at 313–17.
258. See id. at 315–17.
259. See id.
260. The efforts to adopt AEOI by the EU and the OECD had been frustrated by the
resistance of several countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland. Id. at
314–15.
261. Michel, Ziering & Kim, supra note 172, at 76–77.
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EOI provisions in accordance with the OECD standard.262 One of the
outcomes was the revision of the Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAC) in 2010, in which 126 jurisdictions
were participating as of November 2018.263 Although the revised MAAC
did not set AEOI as an obligation, it provides a legal basis and a platform
for AEOI to be implemented multilaterally.264
With the success of the revised MAAC, along with the enactment of the
U.S. FATCA in 2010, AEOI has been met with widespread political support
since 2012. In 2014, G20 leaders and finance ministers endorsed AEOI
as the “new single global standard.”265 In 2014, the OECD released the
Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for AEOI on financial account,266
calling on governments to obtain detailed account information from their
262. The Global Forum now includes 154 member states with 12 observers, making
it the largest tax group in the world. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information
for Tax Purposes, supra note 250.
263. Stafford Smiley, Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 40 J. CORP. TAX’N
21, 21 (2013). For a chart listing participating jurisdictions, see OECD, JURISDICTIONS
PARTICIPATING IN THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX
MATTERS STATUS (2019), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/120718
_Article%2026-ENG_no%20cover%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/WL7M-JNMX]. The United
States signed the MAAC in 2010, which was submitted to the Senate for ratification in 2012.
Patrick Temple-West, Senator Paul Stirs Business Ire Over Blocking of U.S. Tax Treaties,
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-tax-treaties/senator-paulstirs-business-ire-over-blocking-of-u-s-tax-treaties-idUSL2N0AJFS320130428 [https://perma.cc/
B859-2NUT]. However, the Senate has yet to ratify it along with other tax treaties, mainly
due to the strong opposition by Senator Rand Paul, a Republican from Kentucky. Id.
264. Although the focus of the EOI system is moving to the AEOI, EOI upon request
still matters because the current AEOI system is limited to financial account information,
whereas EOI upon request is available to all kinds of tax information. Hence, the Global Forum
is also working to enhance EOI upon request. OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, TAX TRANSPARENCY: 2014 REPORT ON PROGRESS
31 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GFannualreport2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3RPB-7G94].
265. OECD Delivers New Single Global Standard on Automatic Information, OECD
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/taxation/oecd-delivers-new-single-globalstandard-on-automatic-exchange-of-information.htm [https://perma.cc/D3JB-RDHS].
266. Rick Mitchell, Practitioner Sees Possible Negative Effect on Banks as U.S.
Hesitates on Global Standard, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) (Oct. 29, 2014). CRS is modeled
on the U.S. FATCA. See id.; see also Rick Mitchell, Switzerland Signs OECD Agreement
On Automatic Tax Information Exchange, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) (Nov. 19, 2014). The
OECD later adopted the full and comprehensive report on the CRS. OECD, STANDARD FOR
AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS (2014),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-accountinformation-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/A4XE-7L95] [hereinafter
THE STANDARD].

765

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470429

POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/15/2019 10:18 AM

financial institutions and to exchange that information automatically with
other jurisdictions on an annual basis.267 The rationale behind the CRS is
to generate advantages arising from “process simplification, higher effectiveness
and lower costs for all stakeholders concerned.”268 As of April 25, 2019,
105 countries have signed a multilateral instrument to implement the AOI
with the CRS.269 The first AEOI among the group of 49 countries began
in 2017, and the subsequent group of 51 countries, including Switzerland,
followed in 2018.270
Ironically, the United States has not committed to any multilateral instrument
requiring AEOI, such as MAAC and CRS MCAA.271 However, the United
States has undertaken AEOI since 2015 pursuant to FATCA and relating
intergovernmental agreements with other jurisdictions,272 which will be
discussed below.
b. U.S. FATCA
Congress enacted FATCA in 2010 to combat offshore tax evasion.273
FATCA requires that foreign financial institutions (FFIs) and other foreign
entities receiving payments from U.S. sources undertake a series of steps
to identify accounts held by U.S. persons and report information regarding
those accounts on an annual basis to the IRS.274 It is noteworthy that
FATCA sets a category of “investment entity” in the definition of FFI and
includes alternative investment vehicles, including PEFs, in that category.275
Failure to comply could subject the affected institution to a series of 30%
withholding tax on certain U.S. source income.276
267. See THE STANDARD, supra note 266, at 13, 15.
268. Id. at 11. The Standard further provides guidance on IT solutions relating to data
safeguards and confidentiality standards and the transmission and encryption for secure
transmission of information under the CRS. Id. at 17.
269. OECD, SIGNATORIES OF THE MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT
ON AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION AND INTENDED FIRST
INFORMATION EXCHANGE DATE (2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/
international-framework-for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD9Q-QEWK].
270. OECD, AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS (2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/automaticexchange/commitment-and-monitoring-process/AEOI-commitments.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WPF8-C4GN].
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. Summary of FATCA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, supra note 251.
274. See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 97,
97–99 (2010).
275. Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In Defense of
FATCA, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 335, 362 (2017); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(4)(i)(C) (2017).
276. Summary of FATCA Timelines, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/
summary-of-fatca-timelines [https://perma.cc/D43S-X6L4] (last updated June 5, 2018).
Such withholding tax has been imposed on fixed or determinable annual or periodic (FDAP)
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One concern that has arisen is whether FFIs can provide financial
information to the United States pursuant to FATCA without violating
their own domestic banking and privacy laws, as well as the terms of their
contractual relationships with their clients.277 To address this issue, the
United States suggested an alternative approach to the implementation of
FATCA by entering into inter-governmental agreements (IGAs) that would
allow FFIs to comply with FATCA obligations without violating the laws
of their residence countries.278 Starting with the United Kingdom in 2012,
more than 100 countries, including major trading partners as well as bank
secrecy jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands and Switzerland, have
signed or initialed agreements with the United States.279
The major criticism of FATCA in the early phase was that it unilaterally
imposed extraterritorial obligations on FFIs solely for the benefit of the
United States.280 Even after the U.S. government committed to enter into
IGAs to solve issues caused by the unilateral and extraterritorial nature of
FATCA, and even after the FATCA obtained global political support as
momentum for AEOI, many practitioners and government officials complained
about the complex compliance procedure.281
Notwithstanding such criticism, FATCA has provided momentum for
global AEOI. In addition to the AEOI work by the OECD, FATCA spurred

income since July 1, 2014. Id. Withholding tax on gross proceeds from the sale or disposition
of any property that gives rise to FDAP income began January 1, 2019. Id.
277. See Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REV.
363, 364–65; see also Grinberg, supra note 249, at 336.
278. See Grinberg, supra note 249, at 336–37; Kaye, supra note 277, at 366.
279. Ian Bone, FATCA: Compliance by Foreign Jurisdictions, WOLTERS KLUWER
(June 14, 2017), https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/fatca-complianceby-international-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/GT96-UUUH]; Michel, Ziering & Kim,
supra note 172, at 72. As of February 23, 2017, ninety-six countries—including major trading
partners as well as tax secrecy jurisdictions, such as Bermuda, BVI, Cayman Islands, Isle of
Man, Guernsey, Panama, Hong Kong, and Singapore—have signed IGAs with the United
States. Kim, supra note 275, at 361. “Seventeen countries, including China, have initiated
IGAs, and a couple of other countries are in discussions with U.S. authorities about entering
into IGAs.” Id. See IGA Status, TAX NOTES, https://www.taxnotes.com/FATCA-expert/
IGA-status [https://perma.cc/9Z7X-PUQ3], for the current IGA status.
280. Grinberg, supra note 249, at 336.
281. See, e.g., Hillis v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2016] 2 F.C. 235, 238 (Can.). For the
costs and negative collateral consequences of FATCA, see generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane
Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532, 601–08 (2018).
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similar legislation in various jurisdictions.282 Such FATCA-like legislations
and agreements are expected to be integrated in the platform of AEOI
arranged by the Global Forum.283
In conclusion, FATCA appears to have triggered an irreversible trend
toward AEOI. Thanks to the emergence of this new regime in international
taxation, this Article may safely assume the enhanced level of EOI and
multilateral cooperation in tax administration for the Proposal.
c. EU ATADs and DAC6
Building upon the recent developments discussed above, such as the
OECD BEPS project and AEOI, the European Commission (EC) also has
been adopting various measures designed for its member states. Two measures
worth noting with respect the Proposal are the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives
(ATADs)284 and the DAC6.285
The EC adopted the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package in 2016 to ensure
harmonized implementation of the OECD BEPS project within the EU.286
The Package includes a proposal for an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive
(ATAD 1)287 and the amendment to the Directive on mutual assistance to
apply AEOI to country-by-country reporting.288 Thereafter, the EC adopted
ATAD 2 in 2017289 as an amendment to ATAD 1 in order to combat the
hybrid mismatch problem in the EU, including those demonstrated in
Subsection III.C.2.b.290
282. See John McCann & Angela Nightingale, Tax Information Sharing, the Rise
of “FATCA-esque” Agreements, 94 AIMA J. 71, 71–72 (2013), for examples in the United
Kingdom and France.
283. See Grinberg, supra note 249, at 380–82.
284. See generally Council Directive Proposal for Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164
as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries, COM (2016) 687 final (Oct. 25, 2016).
285. See generally Council Directive 2018/822, supra note 246, at 1.
286. The Anti Tax Avoidance Directive, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package/anti-tax-avoidance-directive_en
[https://perma.cc/Z75M-FLV3]; see Rita de la Feria, Editorial, Harmonizing Anti-Tax Avoidance
Rules, 26 EC TAX REV. 110, 110 (2017).
287. See generally Council Directive Proposal for Laying Down Rules Against Tax
Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, at 3, COM
(2016) 26 final (Jan. 28, 2016).
288. Council Directive Proposal for Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards
Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, at 2–4, COM (2016)
25 final (Jan. 28, 2016).
289. Council Directive 2017/952, 2017 O.J. (L 144) 1, 1–2 (EU).
290. Substantively, ATAD 2 applies to four categories of hybrid mismatches: (1) “that
result from payments under a financial instrument;” (2) “that are the consequence of differences
in the allocation of payments made to a hybrid entity or permanent establishment, including as
a result of payments to a disregarded permanent establishment;” (3) “that result from payments
made by a hybrid entity to its owner, or deemed between the head office and permanent

768

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470429

POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 707, 2019]

10/15/2019 10:18 AM

Engineering Pass-Throughs in International Tax
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The second Directive on the AEOI was further amended in 2018.291 As
from June 25, 2018, the so-called DAC6 calls for the mandatory disclosure
of information by intermediary entities in the multinational fund structure,
and in some cases taxpayers, on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes,
many of which are criticized in Section III.C.292 Furthermore, the DAC6
imposes a mandatory EOI on so-collected reportable cross-border transactions
among EU member states to crack down the tax abusive schemes.293 However,
the question remains whether the EU will allow the United States to be
privy to this collected information through other channels for the AEOI.
d. Rationale for EOI as a Prerequisite
In the new regime oriented toward enhanced transparency discussed
above, the tax information is usually obtained by a jurisdiction where nonCIVs are located. Alternatively, this information is sometimes obtained by a
jurisdiction of an investors’ residence country at first hand. The information
is more comprehensive than that currently available to the source country,
such that exchanging the information through EOI upon request and AEOI
would theoretically help to implement the Proposal.
However, there are more important reasons why the Proposal needs EOI
as a prerequisite. If the Proposal just relies on the information available
through EOI, the inevitable time lag between the income distribution and
information provision would significantly delay the tax analysis, which
establishment or between two or more permanent establishments;” and (4) “double deduction
outcomes resulting from payments made by a hybrid entity or permanent establishment.”
Id. at 3.
291. See generally Council Directive 2018/822, supra note 246.
292. See id. at 2; Fionnuala Lynch, Insight: DAC 6—New EU Tax Disclosure Rules:
Cause for Concern?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-dac6new-n73014481548/ [https://perma.cc/6CZC-BBXG]. An intermediary that is subject to
the reporting obligation includes advisory firms, such as accounting firms and law firms,
which is in line with the movement to combat the aggressive tax planning by enforcing
professional ethics of the tax advisers. See generally Heather M. Field, Aggressive Tax Planning
& The Ethical Tax Lawyer, 36 VA. TAX REV. 261 (2017). Member states must put DAC6
into effect by December 31, 2019, but a retrospective element exists that calls for member
states to consider potential reportable transactions that occurred on or before June 25,
2018. ALLEN & OVERY, DAC6—MANDATORY DISCLOSURE TAX REPORTING, WHAT DOES
IT MEAN FOR YOU?, (2018), https://www.aohub.com/aohub/publications/dac6-mandatorydisclosure-tax-reporting?nav=FRbANEucS95NMLRN47z%2BeeOgEFCt8EGQ71hKXzq
W2Ec%3D&key=BcJlhLtdCv6/JTDZxvL23TQa3JHL2AIGr93BnQjo2SkGJpG9xDX7S
2thDpAQsCconWHAwe6cJTlrrH1E07STCrUKIYbf2%2B19 [https://perma.cc/RH6M-HX7C].
293. See Council Directive 2018/822, supra note 246, at 4.
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should be done at the time of distribution. Hence, the Proposal requires the
source country to be provided with tax information and initiate the analysis
of tax consequences of the non-CIV investment when a target company in
the source country distributes income to upper level entities. Such tax
information includes offshore tax information that is not originally subject
to its tax jurisdiction. Under the Proposal, the information may be timely
provided during the process of the tax analysis done by the source country.
However, the accuracy of information collected would be limited if there
are no means for the source country to verify such information by comparing
it with the information on the same transaction obtained by the residence
country. Therefore, as a prerequisite for the Proposal, implementation requires
comprehensive information-sharing in addition to the current AEOI
requirements.
For this purpose, the drawback of the time lag between the income
distribution and information sharing could be alleviated because the information
sharing is essential not just for initiating the tax analysis by tax authorities
but for verifying the tax compliance. If the information provided by taxpayers
to a source country turns out to be inaccurate in the later stage when tax
authorities verify it with the shared information, then tax authorities would
need to reassess the relevant tax and collect the deficient tax amount. Such
rectification might be cumbersome, but the systematic process for improvement
will surely improve taxpayers’ compliance with the Proposal.294
B. The Case of Private Equity Funds: Administrable
Number of Investors
A potential criticism of the Proposal is that it is not practical for source
and residence countries to administer the tax consequences of multinational
investment funds because not all relevant information concerning investors
may be available to the source countries.295 Before the world was equipped
with operational AEOI and FATCA, this information was not available
because it was relating to offshore entities and accounts that were beyond
tax sovereignty of a country. Pursuing such information meant extraterritorial
exercise of tax sovereignty. In the new regime toward transparency, however,
that concern has been alleviated.
But even if we assume that we are going to live in a world equipped
with the second prerequisite—operational AEOI—it is not certain that
such a system would consistently or reliably identify investors behind

294. The risk of noncompliance still exists if the only effective way to collect tax in
the Proposal is by withholding tax. However, such risk is not unique to the Proposal but rather
applies to the overall withholding tax system in international tax.
295. See OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28, at 5.
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non-CIVs for at least two reasons. First, given that the investment structure
of many non-CIVs covers multiple jurisdictions, information shared piece
by piece—or country by country—does not necessarily provide a complete
picture including all relevant investors and ultimate beneficial owners.
Second, AEOI and FATCA apply to financial institutions only, while certain
entities in the chain of non-CIV investment structure are often non-financial
business entities, such as a corporation, a partnership, or a hybrid entity,
which are not included in traditional definitions of financial institutions
and are therefore not likely to be subject to the obligation to provide information
to tax authorities under those systems.296
Such problems of identifying taxpayers could be solved to the extent
that the Proposal requires non-CIVs to provide such information not only
to the residence country but also to the source country. However,
commentators still assert practical difficulty for some types of non-CIV
funds in identifying the tax residence of their investors and thus their
inability to provide such information to source country.297
To illustrate the viability of the Proposal, this Article offers a unique
implementation opportunity for the Proposal in the case of PEFs by showing
that PEFs have an administrable number of investors to identify their residence
country.
PEFs, which are essentially privately held partnerships, are a representative
example of the non-CIV. PEFs use investment structure similar to that of
CIVs, but PEFs’ structure are largely more complex than that of CIVs
because it contains “multiple layers of pass-through entity and corporatetype special purpose vehicles spread across multiple jurisdictions.”298 They
are less transparent to the public than FDI and CIVs, and the information
is less available even to the domestic regulatory agencies because reporting
requirements have been limited.299 That is why the OECD first discussed
CIVs in its discussion on international indirect taxation and then moved
on to non-CIVs, such as private equity.
However, if the administrative authorities tried to obtain information on
the individual investors behind the investment vehicles, it would be easier
to do so for PEFs than for CIVs. This is because PEFs tend to have only
296. See OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 6.
297. The Non-CIV Discussion Draft illustrates that a securitization company “may
not be in a position to identify who its bondholders” are in a fund of funds “where a financial
institution invests in a CIV on behalf of its own clients.” Id.
298. Kim, supra note 8, at 446.
299. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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a handful of high-profile investors, which rarely change during the lifetime
of a fund,300 while CIVs generally have many more, including private retail
investors. Based on the author’s empirical research through the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission EDGAR database301 and PitchBook database,302
the average number of total limited partners (LPs), who are not managing
funds but rather investing in a cross-border private equity fund, for the
past ten years is fifty-seven.303 This is a considerably smaller and more
manageable number than the average 34,411 investor units listed per mutual
fund.304
300. See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 33, at 187.
301. EDGAR stands for the “Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval”
system. Important Information about EDGAR, SEC (Feb. 16, 2010), https://www.sec.
gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm [https://perma.cc/6DCW-BY8Y]; see EDGAR Company Filings,
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/LH7HJ822] (providing accessibility to company filings).
302. PitchBook is a software-as-a-service (SaaS) Company, offering private market
data not available in the S&P 500 Index, Moody’s, and EDGAR. See Pitchbook Continues
on Path to Become One-Stop-Shop for Private & Public Financial Market Data with Launch
of Intraday Market Data, PITCHBOOK (Apr. 24, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/media/pressreleases/pitchbook-continues-on-path-to-become-one-stop-shop-for-private-publicfinancial-market-data-with-launch-of-intraday-market-data [https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-SWWJ].
It is specialized in PEFs, venture capital, mergers and acquisitions, and IPO. See id. It sources
fund-related data primarily from private reporting to itself by limited partners. PITCHBOOK,
PITCHBOOK B ENCHMARKS : P RIVATE E QUITY & V ENTURE C APITAL D ATA THROUGH 1Q
2017, at 4 (2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/4q-2017-pitchbook-benchmarks [https://
perma.cc/5MZF-JE5S]. It also collects data from Form D filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which are a type of exemption that companies may employ
in the offering and sale of securities without the requirement of registration for such with
the SEC. Email from Peter Leslie, Account Manager, PitchBook, to Young Ran (Christine) Kim,
Assoc. Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, (Mar. 1, 2018, 6:06 AM & 2:01 PM
MDT) (on file with author). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2018), for Form D filings.
303. I generated a list of 303 private equity funds that engage in cross-border investment
for the past ten years as sample for this research. First, I limit the vintage year to the range
of January 1, 2008–February 16, 2018, and ran a search for all “Buyout,” “PE [Private
Equity] Growth–Expansion,” and “Diversified PE” funds in the PitchBook database. Then
I excluded the following funds: (1) funds that did not have any investors known to the
Pitchbook, (2) funds that do not offer any geographical indication, (3) the country where
the fund is domiciled and the country where the fund makes investment were identical—
to ensure the funds are engaging in cross-border investment, and (4) funds in the promotion
stage or the early investment period that are still selling securities to the investors.
The above search rendered 763 funds, for which PitchBook offers detailed information
of some investors known to PitchBook, including the identity of investors and their commitment
amount. However, because PitchBook data primarily relies on the private reporting by
investors, it does not offer the total number of investors in a particular fund. That information
is available at EDGAR database thanks to its Form D filings. So, I compared the initial
result obtained from PitchBook with figures available in Section 14 of Form D and excluded
funds that did not have Form D filings listed on the EDGAR database. This left 303 funds
remaining. Further research methodology is on file with the author.
304. According to the reports for year 2017 published the Investment Company Institute
(ICI), 56.2 million households out of the total of 126.2 million households in the United
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More detailed information on the identity of the investors is currently
available for about fifteen investors in PEFs, which is about 27% of the
above fifty-seven average investors.305 Furthermore, information on the
commitment and investment amount of a particular investor is also available
for about twelve investors in PEFs—that is, about 21% of the above fiftyseven average investors.306
FIGURE 12. AVERAGE NUMBER OF LPS

Total Number of LPs

57.3

Ave rage Number of Known LPs

15.27

Ave rage Number of Known LPs
w/ Known Commitments

11.99

The missing detailed information might be obtainable through the newly
enhanced exchange of tax information system, such as FATCA, AEOI, and
DAC6. The global efforts to enhance tax transparency and the exchange

States owned mutual funds. See DANIEL SCHRASS & MICHAEL BOGDAN, INV. CO. INST.,
PROFILE OF MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS, 2017, at 5 fig.1.1 (2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/
rpt_17_profiles17.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6QX-ZW78]. To find the average number of households
per mutual fund, the number of owning households is multiplied by 6, the mean number of
mutual funds owned by U.S. households, and then divided by the number of funds in the
United States, 9,799.
(owning Households) x (mean number of funds owned = (56,200,00)x(6) = 34,411
Total number of funds
9,799
Id. at 13 fig.1.6; EUROPEAN FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, WORLDWIDE REGULATED OPENENDED FUND ASSETS AND FLOWS: TRENDS IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 2018 tbl.7 (2018),
https://www.efama.org/Publications/Statistics/International/Quarterly%20%20International/
180928_International%20Statistical%20Release%20Q2%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9RGT-F47Z]; INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS
AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 242 app. A (57th ed. 2017), https://
www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR82-33A2].
305. Data on file with the author and available upon request.
306. Id.

773

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470429

POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/15/2019 10:18 AM

of information, in addition to these empirical findings, further may make
the Proposal more promising and administrable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The basic goal of a pass-through tax regime is tax neutrality between
direct and indirect taxation. Tax neutrality is generally accomplished in the
domestic tax system. However, tax neutrality failed in the international tax
system, particularly in multinational settings. Current international tax regime
results in either over-taxation or under-taxation for investors in multinational
investment funds.
Thus, this Article offers the Proposal of making pass-through taxation
work in multinational jurisdictions. Suppose that a fund distributes 100%
of its income to its investors, and as a result, it eliminates any substantial
tax liability in the intermediate jurisdictions other than country of source
and residence. In this scenario, such an investment scheme would qualify
for international pass-through taxation. The difference between the Proposal
and the OECD’s approach is that the Proposal gives primary tax authority
to the source country and residence country rather than intermediary countries.
Furthermore, this Article shows the prospect of implementing the Proposal in
the case of PEFs, inspired by PEFs’ unique features promoting administrability
of the Proposal.
This Article fills the gap in international tax scholarship, which lacks
the systematic analysis in foreign indirect investment. However, there are
many issues in cross-border fund investment that are not fully addressed
in this Article, such as deferral of income and allocation of tax jurisdictions
among relevant countries. Moreover, the global community needs to improve
the EOI system to apply it to fund investments. All those topics are future
research topics that can be built upon the ideas of this Article.
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VII. APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE COMPARING THE TAX ANALYSIS OF
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INDIRECT INVESTMENT
Assumptions
 Tax treaty between Country A and Country B: 0% withholding (WH)
tax on dividend, 10% WH tax on interest.
 Tax treaty between Country A and Country D: 15% WH tax on
dividend, 12% WH tax on interest.
 Country B provides holding company regime similar to Luxembourg.
Country C provides offshore pass-through tax regime similar to
the Cayman Islands. Tax amount payable to Countries B and C is
nominal enough to be ignored.
 Country D has a worldwide tax regime with FTC and will apply a
35% tax rate on the foreign source income, except for dividend
and capital gains, which it will tax at a 20% rate. It also provides a
special tax regime for a tax-exempt organization (EO), which exempts
tax on interest, dividends, and capital gains but imposes tax on
unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). Assume income received
by an EO is not UBTI.
 If Country A determines that it is a tax avoiding transaction, it will
deny treaty benefits between Countries A and B and apply domestic
tax law, the maximum tax rate of which on dividend and interest
of nonresident is 30%.
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Problem 1: Target company in Country D distributes 100 of dividend.
a. Direct investment between Country A and Country D
b. Indirect investment (treaty between Countries A and B is applicable,
not challenged by Country A)
c. Indirect investment (treaty between Countries A and B is not
applicable, challenged by Country A)

a. Direct

IOOdiv@ 15% WH =

100 div income@20% =20

Investment

15

(FTC 15)

20

Tax payable to D=5
IfEO,

15

Tax payable to D=0
b. Indirect

!OOd1v@O% WH =0

0

0

100 div income@20% =20

Investment

(No FTC)

(treaty

Tax payable to D=20

shopping)

IfEO,

20

0

Tax payable to D=0
c. Indirect

100div@30% WH =

investment

30

0

0

70* div income@20% = 14

44

(No FTC)**

(challenged

Tax payable to D=14

by A)

IfEO,

30

Tax payable to D=0

*

Only 70 will be considered as taxable income from Country D’s
perspective under the bilateral approach.
** No FTC is allowed as to the tax paid to Country A for the purpose
of income tax in Country D under the bilateral approach.
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Problem 2: Target company in Country D distributes 50 of dividend and
50 of interest, but the character of such income will be recharacterized when
Country B distributes such income for the tax purposes of Country D. Assume
that only 5 will be characterized as interest, and the remaining will be
characterized as dividend.

a. Direct

SO div@ 15% WH = 7.5

50 div income @ 20% = I0

Investment

50 int @ 12% WH = 6

50 int income @ 35% = 17.5

Total tax payable to A = 13.5

(FTC 13 5)

27.5

Ta'< payable to D = 14
13.5

If EO,

Tax payable to D = 0
b. Indirect

50 div @ 0% WH = 0

Investment

50 int @10%WH=5

(treaty

Total tax payable to A= 5

0

0

Gross income = 95

24.75

90•• div income @ 20% =
18

applied)

5* int income @35% = 1.75
(No FTC)* ..
Tax payable to D = 19.75
IfEO,

Tax payable

to

D=0

c. Indirect

50div@30% WH = 15

Investment

50 int @30% WH = 15

6s•• div income @ 20% =

(challenged

Total tax payable to A = 30

13

by A)

0

0

Gross mcome = 70

44.75

5* int income @35% = 1.75

(No FTC)
Tax payable to D = 14 75
IfEO,

30

Tax payable to D = 0
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* Only 5 out of the total income received is characterized as interest.
** In the indirect investment where the treaty between Countries A
and B is applicable, only 95 out of 100 is taxable income from Country
D’s perspective, and 90 out of 95 is dividend. In the indirect
investment where the treaty is not applicable, only 70 out of 100 is
taxable income from Country D’s perspective, and 65 out of 70
is dividend.
*** No FTC is allowed as to the tax paid to Country A for the purpose
of income tax in Country D under the bilateral approach.
Analysis
a. represents a simple FDI scenario, not involving a fund vehicle.
b. represents treaty shopping scenarios. Compared to a., a taxpayer is paying
less tax, and the residence country is likely getting more revenue, while
the source country is losing its revenue.
c. represents ex post, unilateral adjustments by source country. The taxpayer
has to pay too much tax and the source country is collecting too
much tax, compared to both a. and b. How the residence country’s
revenue would be changed is not certain.
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